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REAL PROPERTY LAW*
RALPH E. BOYER** AND DONALD H. Ross***
PRELUDE
Legislative rather than judicial activity accounted for the principal
developments in the field of real property during the period of this sur-
vey.' A new Mechanics' Lien Law,2 a Marketable Title Act,' a Condomin-
ium Act,' and a Land Trust Act5 were enacted by the Florida Legislature
in 1963. Litigation was customarily plentiful, with all major areas of
property law being involved. The homestead continued to be a fruitful
source of litigation and produced perhaps the most noteworthy decision6
of the biennium.
Because of the large number of decisions and the breadth of the sub-
ject matter, this material represents the writers' selection of the most
noteworthy and significant developments. A reaffirmation of principles
well established in Florida, particularly as they apply to commonly re-
curring fact situations, is generally excluded.
The style of this article follows that of the previous surveys,' with
the subject matter divided into seven principal headings:
I. Vendor and Purchaser
II. Deeds-Recording, Description, Parties, Cancellation
III. Estates, Dower, Homestead and Future Interests
IV. Easements, Covenants, Water Law and Zoning
* Acknowledgment is gratefully accorded the Lawyers' Title Guaranty Fund, Orlando,
Florida, for its annual grant to the University of Miami School of Law. This contribution is
used at the University of Miami to encourage student research in property law and to aid
professors in the research and preparation of articles. The preparation of this paper was
aided by the Fund's contribution.
** Professor of Law, University of Miami.
*** Member of Florida Bar; Cook Fellow, University of Michigan Law School, 1964-65.
1. The period covered is the 1961-1963 biennium, or more specifically, volume 132
through page 128 of volume 155 of the Southern Reporter, second series, and applicable
Federal Reports.
2. FLA. STAT. §§ 84.011-.361 (1963). Citations to discussions of the new law can be found
infra, note 281.
3. FLA. STAT. §§ 712.01-.10 (1963). See generally Boyer & Shapo, Florida's Marketable
Title Act: Prospects and Problems, 18 U. MiAmi L. REV. 103 (1963); 1 BOYER, FLORIDA
REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS §§ 14.14-1 to -11 (rev. 1964).
4. FLA. STAT. §§ 711.01-23 (1963). The act is discussed in 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL
ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, ch. 39 (rev. 1964).
5. FLA. STAT. § 689.071 (1963). For a discussion of the act see 18 U. Mumi L. REv. 699
(1964).
6. Reed v. Fain, 145 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1962). See text accompanying notes 101 & 138 infra,
and Note, 17 U. Mumi L. REv. 643 (1963).
7. See 8 MumAI L.Q. 389 (1954); 10 MiAMI L.Q. 389 (1956); 12 Mrusmi L.Q. 499
(1958); 14 MLAmi L.Q. 638 (1960) ; 16 MiAmi L.Q. 139 (1961).
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V. Adverse Possession, Dedication, Tax Titles and Eminent
Domain
VI. Mechanics' Liens and Mortgages
VII. Landlord and Tenant.
The major items of legislation are not included in this article since
they merit special attention and are treated separately.' Other legislative
changes are noted in the appropriate sections.
I. VENDOR AND PURCHASER
A. Oral Contracts to Devise; How to Not Enforce
The Florida statute' which renders unenforceable parol contracts to
make a will was twice considered by appellate courts during the period
of this survey. Unfortunately, from the point of view of substantive law,
the cases were primarily concerned with matters of pleading; thus, the
precise nature and effect of the statute hardly can be considered to be
definitely established. The courts have not decided whether, assuming the
defense of the statute is properly raised, the statute will render all such
contracts void or unenforceable in spite of such doctrines as part perform-
ance, estoppel, and promissory estoppel.
In Cypen v. Frederick," the plaintiff obtained a decree in the trial
court against an executor for the specific performance of an oral contract
to convey realty in exchange for services which had been performed for the
decedent during his lifetime. The services had been substantially per-
formed before the enactment of the statute in question, and the defense
of the statute was not raised prior to the appeal. In sustaining the decree
for specific performance, the appellate court stated that the statute in
question was similar to the Statute of Frauds," that it created a defense
personal to the defendant which must be affirmatively pleaded or is waived,
and that since the defendant did not raise the issue in the trial court, he
was estopped from raising it for the first time on appeal.
The case of Fletcher v. Williams"2 also involved the enforcement of
an oral contract to convey or devise land in return for services.The court
8. See notes 2-5 supra.
9. FLA. STAT. § 731.051 (1963). This statute provides:
No agreement to make a will of real or personal property or to give a legacy or
make a devise shall be binding or enforceable unless such agreement is in writing
signed in the presence of two subscribing witnesses by the person whose executor
or administrator is sought to be charged.
10. 139 So.2d 201 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
11. FLA. STAT. § 725.01 (1963). This statute reads in part:
No action shall be brought . . . upon any contract for the sale of lands, tenements
or hereditaments, or of any uncertain interest in or concerning them .. . unless the
agreement or promise upon which such action shall be brought, or some note or
memorandum thereof shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged
therewith or by some other person by him thereunto lawfully authorized.
12. So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
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followed the analogy13 of Cypen v. Frederick 4 to the effect that this
statute is similar to the Statute of Frauds, and then held that it creates
an affirmative defense which must be pleaded in an answer and cannot be
raised by a motion to dismiss.'3 The majority of the court also noted that
the statute in question was simply declaratory of the decisional law of
the state.'6
In a challenging dissent,' Justice Sturgis took sharp issue with the
majority, not only as to the pleading questions concerning the proper
method of raising the defense, but also as to the very nature of the statute.
Instead of regarding the statute as no more than a statute of frauds ap-
plicable to wills, the dissenting justice considered it both as invalidating
such oral contracts and absolutely barring their enforcement. Thus the
statute would establish a substantive public policy and not simply a de-
fense personal to the the party defendant. Hence, the absolute unenforce-
ability of contract would be subject to attack by a motion to dismiss.
Insofar as the language of the two statutes is concerned, the difference
is between "no action shall be brought ... " and "no agreement . . . shall
be binding or enforceable . . . ,,1s Thus, a distinction such as Justice Stur-
gis makes is plausible so long as not "binding" is equated to not "valid."
However, the difference in wording is not so obviously fundamental that
it compels such a conclusion. If literally "no action can be brought," it
would seem that the contract would necessarily not be "binding or en-
forceable"; on the other hand, if the contract is "not binding or enforce-
able," it would seem that "no action can be brought." Hence, the two
statutes may mean exactly the same thing. Neither statute expressly de-
dares that such contracts are void. Further, from a policy viewpoint,
should the statute be so vigorously construed that oral contracts to
devise could never be enforced regardless of how much reliance, how much
service, how much performance, how much detriment is incurred by the
other party? To the extent that these decisions leave room for application
of principles of specific performance, promissory estoppel and estoppel
13. Since the statute was raised for the first time on appeal in the Cypen case, the deci-
sion may have been predicated simply on the proposition that matters not considered by or
raised in the trial court cannot be asserted at the appellate level.
Accord, as to the proposition that the Statute of Frauds cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal: Lerer v. Arvida Realty Co., 134 So.2d 798 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
14. 139 So.2d 201 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
15. Fletcher v. Williams, 153 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
16. Id. at 761.
17. Id. at 765.
18. Another distinction between the two statutes overlooked by both the majority and
the dissent is the requirement in § 731.051 (probate statute) that the contract be witnessed,
whereas there is no such requirement in § 725.01. This may buttress Justice Sturgis' opinion
that the former statute establishes a public policy rendering contracts which do not comply
therewith not only unenforceable but also void. If equitable principles will permit the en-
forcement of an unwritten contract, the requirements not only of a writing and signature
but also of witnesses will have to be disregarded.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XVIII
generally, they permit a desired flexibility and prevent the statute from
itself becoming an instrumentality of fraud.
B. Specific Performance; Damages
In a case of first impression in Florida,1" the Third District Court
of Appeal has held that a seller of land will be denied the remedy of speci-
fic performance when the sales contract contains a provision for liquidated
damages and the language discloses that the parties intended to limit the
seller to this remedy in the event the purchaser defaulted in his perform-
ance. The language of the contract in question specifically stated that
in the event the purchaser defaulted the seller should retain the deposit
as liquidated damages "and the parties hereto shall be relieved of all obli-
gations under this instrument."2 The decision seems bottomed on the
well-established principle that in an action for specific performance, the
court will not make a new or different contract for the parties simply be-
cause the one made by them proves ineffectual.2 The decision also points
up the desirability of inserting into sales contracts a specific performance
clause as an alternative remedy -to a liquidated damages provision. 2
Specific performance in favor of the seller will be denied when the
seller is unable to proffer a deed which complies with conditions specified
in the contract. Thus, when a contract recited that the land was being
sold subject to restrictions, but that none of the restrictions were violated
by the premises, specific performance was denied when there was a vio-
lation of a set-back provision.2 3 As an alternative basis of decision, the
court said that specific performance will be denied when the vendor can-
not convey good title to any interest in the property. The occasion for
the assertion of this rule was the fact that the sellers had conveyed and
sold the property pending appellate disposition.24 In another case, 2 it was
held that although the purchaser may have notified the vendor of his
intention to exercise an option, specific performance nevertheless will be
denied if the purchaser fails to take affirmative action to bring about a
closing within a reasonable time after notifying the seller.
C. Agency
The general principle that a broker cannot act as agent for both the
buyer and seller without the consent of each was reaffirmed but found inap-
19. Dillard Homes, Inc. v. Carroll, 152 So.2d 738 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
20. Id. at 739.
21. Giehler v. Ward, 77 So.2d 452 (Fla. 1955).
22. For an example of such an optional provision see BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS § 4.07 (1959).
23. Krause v. Owens, 138 So.2d 370 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
24. Ibid.
25. Stenvall v. Wilson, 134 So.2d 502 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
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plicable in Lerer v. Arvida Realty Co." That case held that a real estate
salesman not subject to orders and directions of the purchaser and who
was to be paid by the seller was not a dual agent of both seller and pur-
chaser. Further, the purchaser's action for return of the deposit was de-
nied on a finding that there was no fraudulent misrepresentation.
The long established common law rule that a contract executed
under seal is not enforceable against an undisclosed principal prevailed in
a recent case27 when the vendors sought specific performance against
the undisclosed principals of an agent who had executed the contract as
the purchaser.
D. Time of the Essence
General principles governing the essentiality of time limitations28
specified in real estate contracts were reaffirmed in a recent case29 in
which those principles were apparently overlooked by the attorneys and
trial court. The contract in question provided that on or before a certain
date the seller would furnish an abstract or a commitment of title insur-
ance showing his title to be good and marketable, and that if the title was
not marketable, the seller would have a reasonable time to make it market-
able. The trial court had granted a summary judgment in favor of the
purchaser, enabling him to recover his deposit because of the seller's fail-
ure to furnish an abstract or insurance commitment on the date specified.
In reversing the summary judgment because of the existence of substan-
tial issues of material fact, the appellate court stated that the provision
allowing the seller a reasonable time to make the title marketable after
the date specified for the furnishing of an abstract raised a question of
whether time really was of the essence. Further, even if time had been
made of the essence by liberally construing the purchaser's notice of ter-
mination as a demand for strict performance, the seller still would have
had a reasonable time in which to comply. Thus, there were material
questions not only as to possible waiver but also as to whether there was
a breach of the contract at all.3"
E. Fraud and Rescission; The Non-Looking Leapers
In order to justify rescission for fraud or misrepresentation the com-
plaining party, usually the purchaser, must not only show that he relied
26. 134 So.2d 798 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
27. McMullen v. McMullen, 145 So.2d 568 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
28. Those principles are: time is generally considered of the essence in actions at law
but is not considered so in equity unless the parties specifically so provide. Further, although
time is not made of the essence originally, it can be so made even after time for performance
by the nondefaulting party making a demand and giving notice that the other party perform
within a specified reasonable time. See generally BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
§ 4.04 (1959) ; National Exhibition Co. v. Ball, 139 So.2d 489 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
29. National Exhibition Co. v. Ball, supra note 28.
30. Ibid.
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on the misrepresentations, but also that he was justified in so relying.31
As a measure of the purchaser's right to rely, the courts are well agreed
that he must use reasonable diligence to ascertain the truth, "because the
court[s] will not protect those who with full opportunity to do so will
not protect themselves. ' 32 These principles frequently are applied in
situations involving exaggerations of the magnitude of profits being real-
ized from the operation of business property. Thus, in Kaminsky v. Wye,8"
the purchaser entered into a contract for the purchase of a motel upon
the seller's representation that the income from the property for the pre-
ceding year had been in excess of 24,000 dollars. Three months after
closing, the purchaser sued for rescission when he discovered the actual
income was 16,000 dollars. At trial, the evidence revealed that the
sellers consistently refused to supply the purchaser with any proof of the
supposed income and indicated that they would not do so even if the
transaction were not consummated. Only on the day of closing did the
sellers furnish a list of advance reservations and this disclosed reserva-
tions for only four to six people, though the purchaser had been told that
the motel was booked solid for twelve weeks in advance. Under these
circumstances the court denied relief, finding that although the purchaser
"had every conceivable notice of the fraud," he still chose to close the
transaction.8
The question of justifiable reliance was further examined in Ramel
v. Chasebrook Constr. Co. 5 an action for damages for fraud and deceit.
In this case, the president of a tract development corporation represented
to the prospective buyers of a house that it was "well constructed."3" In
reality, the house had been erected on a muck foundation after the firm
had been warned by an engineer not to do so. Shortly after the buyer
moved in, the house developed cracks as the foundation, patio and pool
began to settle and pull away from the house. On trial, the corporation
defended on two grounds: first, that no positive representations had been
made, and second, that there was no reliance, since the purchasers had
visibly inspected the premises before purchase.
As to the first defense, the court held that although in the nature
of opinion, "statements of a party having exclusive or superior knowledge
may be regarded as statements of fact although they would be considered
as opinion if the parties were dealing on equal terms."" As to the second
defense, the court noted that the foundation was laid upon knee deep muck
without proper support and was not visible or discoverable without excava-
31. Boyer, Real Property Law, 14 U. Miami L. REV. 638, 645 (1960).
32. George E. Sebring Co. v. Skinner, 100 Fla. 315, 323, 129 So. 759, 762 (1930).
33. 132 So.2d 44 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
34. These, in essence, are the words of the trial court. Id. at 47.
35. 135 So.2d 876 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
36. Id. at 879.
37. Id. at 882.
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tion. Hence, a visible inspection in itself would not be sufficient to pre-
clude reliance. Accordingly, a judgment of dismissal was reversed. 8
The basic proposition that a contract cannot be rescinded when it is
impossible to put the parties back in their original positions was re-
affirmed in Smith v. Chopman.9 The plaintiffs in this case bought a parcel
of realty from the defendants, who in turn granted a 99-year lease to the
plaintiffs on another piece of property. In the interval before they sought
rescission, the plaintiffs defaulted on the mortgage payment and the
defendants assigned their interests as lessors to a purchaser for value
without notice. Thus, rescission of the contract was denied because neither
of the parties could have been restored to their original positions.
F. Equitable Conversion
General principles of equitable conversion 40 were employed to help
ascertain the rights of a vendee against the estate of a deceased vendor
and to allocate insurance proceeds of a fire policy between a divorced
couple. The cases discussed below are consistent with traditional conver-
sion doctrine, but the first extends without discussion the protection of the
recording act to the holder of an equitable interest beyond previous Florida
decisions."'
Buck v. McNab42 was a suit for specific performance of a contract to
convey against the executor of the estate of a deceased vendor. The chan-
cellor had dismissed the complaint because of laches and because of the
plaintiff's failure to comply with the non-claim statute.41 In reversing, the
appellate court found no laches because the delay was primarily caused
by the defendants and because the purchasers had not been aware of
previous unrecorded deeds. The court also found it unnecessary for the
38. Ramel v. Chasebrook Constr. Co., supra note 35. A dissenting opinion took the view
that the evidence was insufficient to prove the allegation of misrepresentation.39. 135 So.2d 438 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961). The broker in this case had promised to "amass
a fortune" for the plaintiffs by trading in realty, and he was also charged with wrongful
dual representation.
40. I.e., that the purchaser is regarded in equity as the owner of a real property interest
and the vendor as the holder of a personal property interest, the right to the purchase money,
because equity regards as done that which ought to be done. The doctrine is discussed in the
cases cited at notes 42 & 45 inIra.
41. See text accompanying notes 42 & 72-75 infra.
42. 139 So.2d 734 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
43. FLA. STAT. § 733.16 (1961):
No claim or demand, whether due or not, direct or contingent, liquidated or unliqui-
dated, or claim for personal property in the possession of the personal representative
or for damages, including but not limited to actions founded upon fraud or other
wrongful act or commission of the decedent, shall be valid or binding upon an estate,
or upon the personal representative thereof, or upon any heir, legatee or devisee of
the decedent unless the same shall be [filed in the prescribed manner] and no cause
of action, at law or in equity heretofore or hereafter accruing, including but not
limited to actions founded upon fraud or other wrongful act or omission, shall
survive the death of the person against whom such claim may be made, whether suit
be pending at the time of the death of such person or not, unless such claim be filed
in the manner and within the said six months as aforesaid.
1964]
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vendees to comply with the non-claim statute, since the doctrine of equi-
table conversion regarded their interest as realty, thus in rem in nature,
and as an equitable claim to specific property exempted from the necessity
of complying with the non-claim statute." Jurisdiction over the minor
defendants, however, had not been properly obtained.45
In McNeill v. McNeill,"' a property settlement agreement between
a husband and wife pending divorce stipulated that the husband should
receive real estate owned by the entireties upon his paying the wife one
half of their "equity" in the realty. After the agreement was reached,
the dwelling burned, and the chancellor did not include the provision for
the property settlement in his final decree. The appellate court analogized
the position of the husband to that of a purchaser, and employed the
doctrine of equitable conversion to determine that he was entitled to the
insurance proceeds subject, however, to the prior claim of the wife to
payment of the agreed purchase price.47
G. Installment Sales-Contract or Security?
The interplay of contract and security principles in the resolution of
of controversies involving installment land contracts continues to relegate
these instruments into an amorphous status of uncertainty. Hence, it is dif-
ficult to determine in advance which set of principles will be emphasized
by !the courts in a particular case. Nevertheless, there appears to be a
groping, perhaps an unconscious groping, toward the position of treating
such contracts as primarily security devices. The results of the cases are
not uniform, and the trend can hardly be considered pronounced or vigor-
ous since much of the support for this position can be explained away or
regarded as dictum. And, of course, -the terms of the precise contract and
the precise issue before the court are the most significant in settling any
particular controversy. However, it would seem that there are common
features applicable -to most installment land contracts and that prima
facie, at least, a preference for one position or the other might be ex-
pected. An analysis of the recent cases follows.
Riehl v. Bennett"' purportedly followed the principle that on the
44. 139 So.2d at 737. Quoting from 33 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 118, at
1073 (1942), the court said:
Property which a decedent held as trustee or in any other fiduciary capacity does not
at his death properly constitute part of his estate; title to the property may pass
to decedent's heirs or personal representatives, but it does so clothed with the fidu-
ciary obligation. Such property cannot be charged with the debts of decedent, or
with the expense of administering the estate. The fact that the fiduciary treated the
property as his own does not alter the rule; so decedent's wrongful act in selling
trust property does not make the proceeds of the sale part of his estate.
45. The minor defendants were grantees in the unrecorded deed. The decree was not
entered as to them until jurisdiction was properly obtained. Service had been made on the
minors themselves but not upon their guardian.
46. 135 So.2d 785 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1961).
47. Id. at 788.
48. 142 So.2d 761 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
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purchaser's default on an installment contract, the seller has a choice of
remedies: he may proceed under the forefeiture clause usually included
in such contract, or he may sue the defaulting purchaser for full com-
pensatory damages. 49 In the particular case, however, the second remedy
was denied because of the application of the principles of election of
remedies and estoppel. It was held that the vendor by accepting a
quitclaim deed from the defaulting purchaser waived his right to the lat-
ter remedy. In this case the defaulting purchaser, apparently for the pur-
pose of relieving himself of further liability, voluntarily executed and
recorded a quitclaim deed conveying the subject property back to the sel-
ler. Thereafter, the seller resold the property for an amount less than
the original purchase price. In denying the seller the right to recover the
difference between the original price and the amount for which the land
was later sold, the court held that the "tender""0 of the deed required
an election on the part of the seller either to refuse the benefits of the
tendered deed or to accept it in full satisfaction of the contract along with
the forfeited payments. In reality, the court's discussion of the seller's
right to hold the purchaser to full damages may be regarded as a dictum
since the seller was not accorded such right in the instant case. Similarly,
any suggestion that the seller would have the right in any case to declare
a forfeiture regardless of how much was paid by the purchaser is likewise
obiter since in the instant case the purchaser acquiesced in and actually
desired that result. In short, it was not determined whether or not the
vendor would have had to treat the contract as a security device and fore-
close in the event the purchaser had insisted.
Mid-State Inv. Corp. v. O'Steen5" held that the particular install-
ment contract was a mortgage and that the vendor had no legal right
to repossess the realty after a default by the purchaser. Accordingly, the
vendor was liable for trespass and conversion of personalty when he
repossessed the land and exercised dominion over the personalty.
The facts of O'Steen are most significant and very conducive to the
result reached by the court. They involved a husband and wife who pur-
chased a house and paid for it with the money which they borrowed from
the defendant investment company. As part of the loan transaction, the
husband and wife "assigned" 2 their deed to the company and took back
49. See generally Chace v. Johnson, 98 Fla. 118, 123 So. 519 (1929); Riehl v. Bennett,
supra note 48. Actually the quotations from Chace v. Johnson stated the second option of the
vendor as "bringing action upon the unqualified agreement of the purchaser to pay." Might
this not be a legal action substantially equivalent to specific performance?
50. The Riehl court stated that the critical point was when the vendors became aware
of the recorded quitclaim deed. At that point they were obligated either to refuse the deed
or to accept it in full satisfaction of the contract. 142 So.2d at 763.
51. 133 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961),, cert. denied, 136 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1961); dis-
cussed in 16 U. Miavai L. REv. 493 (1962).
52. These are the words of the court. Certainly, "assignment of the deed" is not the
usual method of conveying or mortgaging property. Compare the English procedure of
1964]
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an unrecorded contract for deed, or an installment land contract. Upon
a default by the purchasers, the defendant's representative entered the
premises, took possession of the realty and personalty and resold the prop-
erty.5" Under these circumstances, it was held -that the contract for deed
was intended as security for the payment of money and was a mortgage
under the Florida statute.54 Since there was an actual borrowing of money
by the purchasers from the investment company, the analogy to a mort-
gage is particularly strong. Viewed in terms of its facts, the case is scant
authority for the proposition that all installment land contracts are in fact
devices to secure the payment of money and hence should be treated as
security devices similar to mortgages. But as a matter of fact, are not
installment contracts essentially that?
The case of Huguley v. Hall55 extended the rationale of the O'Steen
case by citing it and stating that a purchaser "[under] a contract for
deed .. . is ordinarily entitled to an equity of redemption . . .subject
to the protection of a court of equity."" However, the statement is purely
dictum because in the instant case the purchaser was not afforded pro-
tection of his equity of redemption. The supreme court, in discharging a
writ of certiorari, affirmed the trial and appellate court decisions for-
feiting the rights of the vendee. In this case, the seller had brought an ac-
tion in equity to declare the contract null and void after alleging his elec-
tion to "rescind"5 and terminate the contract.
The supreme court in Hall gave as a basis for its decision the fact
that the vendee had failed to assert affirmatively his equity of redemption
and thus was deemed to have abandoned it.58 Unfortunately, the case was
creating an equitable mortgage by the deposit of title deeds. See generally OSBORNE, MORT-
GAGES 70 (1951).
53. Most of the furniture in the house was subject to a purchase money mortgage
executed by the plaintiffs to a local store. The defendant's representative called the store to
repossess the furniture, which they did. He then gave some tools found in the house to a
neighbor to hold for the plaintiffs and sold the property to the neighbor's half-brother. All
this occurred while the plaintiffs were away on a trip, so that when they returned all they
found was a box of rags and a washing machine. The remainder of their personal effects were
"lost."
54. FLA. STAT. § 697.01 (1961). This statute provides:
All conveyances, obligations conditioned or defeasible, bills of sale or other instru-
ments of writing conveying or selling property, either real or personal, for the pur-
pose or with the intention oj securing the payment of money, whether such instru-
ment be from the debtor to the creditor or from the debtor to some third person in
trust for the creditor, shall be deemed and held mortgages, and shall be subject to
the same rules of foreclosure and to the same regulations, restraints and forms as
are prescribed in relation to mortgages. (Emphasis added.)
55. 157 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1963), afirming by discharging writ, 141 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1962).
56. 157 So.2d at 418.
57. The attorneys and the courts apparently used the term rescind as a synonym for
terminate or cancel. There was no attempt to return to the purchaser amounts paid on behalf
of the purchase price or otherwise restore the parties to status quo. What was sought and
obtained was a forfeiture of the purchaser's interest.
58. Supra note 56.
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involved in issues of procedure; the supreme court stated that if the ac-
tion were regarded as in the nature of a quiet title suit by a seller not
in possession, the purchaser's failure to demand a jury trial would con-
stitute a waiver." The case is therefore unsatisfactory from a substantive
viewpoint.
The Hall case was instituted as a suit in equity. There is a maxim
that he who seeks equity must do equity. Seeking a bald declaration of
forfeiture is hardly doing equity. Further, if the court really meant that
the purchaser had an equity of redemption, the easy abandonment of it
in the case at hand seems inconsistent with centuries of equity jurisdiction
in mortgage cases wherein .the courts go to great lengths to protect the
equity of redemption.6" Of course, it is possible that the purchaser had
paid only a small portion of the purchase price and was not in a position
to redeem. The purchaser had filed a motion to dismiss and later an an-
swer preserving the attack upon the sufficiency of the complaint, and the
trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.6 ' If,
in reality, the vendor's legal title is retained, as the court stated, simply
for security purposes, then must not the vendor enforce his claim by fore-
closing the vendee's interest? And, on the other hand, if the vendor should
be accorded the right to terminate the contract and forfeit the rights of
the vendee, after his election to do so should not his proper remedy be
ejectment to recover possession of the land?62
The nature of an installment land contract has also received judi-
cial scrutiny in the area of its liability to taxation. The cases here also
point toward the security approach. The first case during this biennium
took a contrary view, but it was later restricted to the peculiar terms of the
contract in question. In State v. Green63 the supreme court held that an
agreement for deed, containing details for executing a purchase and sale
agreement and relating to a promissory note, was not a written obliga-
tion to pay money and thus was not subject to the documentary stamp
tax.64 It should be noted, however, that the instrument in question pro-
59. Ibid.
60. Although not directly in point, the promulgation of rules prohibiting clogging of the
equity of redemption indicates the extent to which the equity courts protect the mortgagor.
See generally OsBoRNE, op. cit. supra note 52, at 233. Perhaps the judgment or decree in the
instant case could be considered a strict foreclosure-a really strict foreclosure in which the
vendee is given no time at all in which to redeem.
61. See the dissenting opinion of Justice Sturgis in Huguley v. Hall, 141 So.2d 595, 597
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1962). The supreme court's statement of the proceedings, see notes 56 and 57
supra, minimize the efforts of the defendant to raise the procedure issue hut emphasize the
defendant's failure to raise an equitable defense. The complaint did allege the contract and
also default by the vendee so it probably was sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. See
statement of facts in the two opinions cited note 55 supra.
62. This was one of the principal points in Justice Sturgis' dissent in Huguley v. Hall,
supra note 61. Of course, if the contract is recorded, then an action in equity is necessary to
have it cancelled of record or removed as a cloud on title.
63. 132 So.2d 761 (Fla. 1961).
64. The tax is imposed by FLA. STAT. § 201.08 (1961).
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vided specifically that it imposed no personal liability on the buyer,
and that the seller would look only to the land itself for payment of the
balance of the purchase price.
In Gulf American Land Corp. v. Green,65 on the other hand, the
contract for deed did not specifically restrict the seller to a recovery of
possession of the land although the vendors had testified that in their
many years of experience in the use of thousands of such contracts they
had never sought personal judgments against the vendees.66 Both the court
of appeal and the supreme court, nevertheless concluded that the con-
tract was a device to secure the payment of money and was subject to
the documentary -tax stamp. Another tax case, Jasper v. Orange Lake
Homes, Inc.,37 also held that contracts for deed constituted obligations
for the payment of money secured by vendors' liens on realty, and ac-
cordingly were taxable only once as class C intangible personalty and not
as class D intangible personalty requiring yearly taxation.68
Thus, there seems to be a discernible trend toward the recognition of
the installment contract as in fact a security device. Unfortunately, the
courts have not as yet forthrightly stated so in unequivocal terms so as
to protect fully the rights of a vendee to the same extent accorded a
mortgagor. Until there are further developments in this area, the happen-
stance application of either security or contract provisions, along with pre-
occupation with pleading issues possibly created because of substantive
uncertainty, will probably result in continued ambiguity. A fresh and de-
finitive judicial analysis of the installment land contract is long overdue.
II. DEEDS-RECORDING, DESCRIPTION, PARTIES, CANCELLATION
A. Vendee Protected by Recording Act
The Second District Court of Appeal, apparently unaware that it
was doing so, extended the protection of the recording act6" to the holder
of an equitable interest, namely a vendee under a contract to purchase.7 °
Previously, the Florida cases had restricted such protection to innocent
purchasers of legal interests.7 1
In Buck v. McNab72 the owner, by unrecorded deeds, conveyed two
parcels of realty to his minor grandsons, in consideration of their love and
65. 149 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962), cert. denied, 157 So.2d 70 (Fla. 1963). The tax
was held not applicable during the first six months when the purchasers had an unqualified
right to rescind, but the obligation to pay was obligatory after the six months passed and
the purchasers no longer had the right to rescind. The tax became due at that time.
66. Gulf American Land Corp. v. Green, 157 So.2d 70, 71 (Fla. 1963).
67. 151 So.2d 331 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
68. See FLA. STAT. §§ 199.02(3)-(4) (1963) as to the difference.
69. FLA. STAT. § 695.01 (1961).
70. See note 72 infra.
71. Bauman v. Peacock, 80 So.2d 365 (Fla. 1955); Myers v. Van Buskirk, 96 Fla. 704,
119 So. 123 (1928); BOYER, FLORIDA REAxL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 28.05 (1959).
72. 139 So.2d 734 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962), cert. denied, 146 So.2d 374 (Fla. 1962).
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affection.73 Later, the original owner entered into a written contract to
convey the same parcels to Buck. Sometime after the owner died, his exec-
utor-son discovered the unrecorded deeds and decided that a clear title
could not be conveyed. During several years of delay resulting largely
because of procrastination or equivocation on the part of the executor,
the land increased in value. In an action for specific performance, the
trial court dismissed the complaint and ordered return of the deposit.74 In
reversing, the appellate court classified the vendee a purchaser entitled to
the protection of the recording act. 75 This conclusion does not seem to be
justified.76 Traditionally, the recording act has been utilized to resolve
disputes between competing legal interests. In the ordinary commercial
transaction, the purchaser normally does not rely on the recording act at
the time he enters into the contract; rather, it is after the contract is
signed that the purchaser examines the title and then decides whether or
not to complete the purchase. If before the closing the vendee learns of
unrecorded deeds, inconsistent possession or other circumstances, he usu-
ally cannot qualify as a bona fide purchaser without notice. Further,
even when the purchaser has acquired the legal title, if he receives notice
of a defect in the title before paying the entire consideration, he is only
entitled to pro tanto protection.7 7 In the instant case, by obtaining spe-
cific performance, the vendee acquired as full protection of the recording
act as if he had paid the full price and received a deed before obtaining
notice.
B. Description and Boundaries-Accretion
During the period covered by this survey, two cases 78 involving
water boundaries were decided and a number of well settled principles
73. That the grantees under the first or prior deed are donees is immaterial. They obtain
title as a result of being first, and they are divested only if their deeds are unrecorded, and
only in favor of subsequent bona fide purchasers without notice under the recording act
FIA. STAT. § 695.01 (1963). The subsequent grantee, however, cannot obtain priority over
earlier unrecorded instruments unless he is a purchaser, that is, unless he pays value.
74. 139 So.2d at 736.
75. Id. at 738-39.
76. See generally 6 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 283 (1958), and 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
§ 1279 (1920), for the proposition that some states extend the protection of the recording
act to purchasers of equitable interests. If the rule is to be extended, it should be done so
forthrightly, with accompanying reasons. The purchaser in the instant case suffered additional
detriment by clearing the lots and planting trees, but he did not pay the full purchase price or
receive the legal title.
77. 8 THOMPsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 4322 (1963 repl.).
78. In Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund v. Toffel, 145 So.2d 737 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1962), cert. denied, 153 So.2d 305 (Fla. 1963), the appellate court held that the natural
boundary of public lands on a river controlled and not the meander line of the original
government survey. Thus, under the holding of the chancellor that the original grantees
in the chain of title owned to the high water mark, title to any accretion accrued to the
plaintiff. There were 386 acres involved.
In Lopez v. Smith, 145 So.2d 509 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962), the appellate court sustatined
the lower court's findings that the river involved was navigable and had been so at the
time of statehood and the original survey. Thus, the high water marks and not the meander
lines constituted the boundaries of the lots in question.
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were reaffirmed: (1) a meander line is generally not a boundary but
merely defines the general contour of the shore; (2) In the absence of
exceptions or reservations, patents and other conveyances shown to
border on a navigable stream or body of water carry title to the ordinary
high water mark and include the unmeasured strip which usually exists
between the water's edge and the meander line; (3) A meander line may
constitute a boundary where it is intended or where discrepancies between
the meander line and the ordinary high water line leave an excess of
unsurveyed land so great as to clearly and palpably indicate fraud or mis-
take in the survey.
Travis Co. v. City of Coral Gables79 involved a rather unusual appli-
cation of the rule that a conveyance of a parcel of land according to a
plat, which parcel is bound by a street or other right of way, carries with
it title to the center of such street or right of way. The unusual factor in
the case was that the "right of way" was an undug canal that had never
been dedicated. The court applied the rule and held that the owners of the
abutting lots were the fee simple owners to the center line of the canal.
In an ejectment suit occasioned by a boundary controversy, it was
held that the cost of a survey is not an element of allowable damages."0
The tremendous length of Florida coastline and the constant chang-
ing of the numerous islands or keys by various methods of accretion,
alluvion, erosion, reliction and avulsion,81 create myriad title problems,
and as the land becomes more valuable, litigation increases. In Ford v.
Turner,82 land formerly facing the Gulf of Mexico was almost completely
blocked off by the lateral southerly extension of an island with only a
navigable channel separating the island from the mainland. The court con-
cluded that the island had grown by accretion, not avulsion, and that title
to the accreted lands belonged to the owner of the island lots to which
they were attached.88
C. Trusts and Trustees
Purported conveyances in trust may have varied consequences: they
may result in the creation of a valid trust with separation of legal and
equitable title," in the entire interest vesting in the "trustee" where the
79. 153 So.2d 750 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963.
80. Kosaber v. Peterson, 136 So.2d 366 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
81. The terms are defined in BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 13.07 (3)
(1959).
82. 142 So.2d 335 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962). This case, as well as others discussed in a for-
mer survey, 16 U. MIAmi L. REv. 145 (1961), illustrate the difficulty of tracing the physical
contours of the land over a period of years and of determining whether the changes were
gradual and imperceptible or sudden and perceptible as a result of a hurricane or other
pronounced phenomenon.
83. Ford v. Turner, supra note 82. The case is criticized in a Note, 17 U. MzAh L. REv.
417 (1963).
84. BOYER, op. cit. supra note 81, § 10.O5.
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words "as trustee" are considered simply as words "descripto personae,""8
in the entire interest vesting in the named beneficiary as the result of a
dry or passive trust being executed by the Statute of Uses,86 or it may re-
sult in an Illinois type land trust under the recent statute.8 7 Or, when the
draftsman is sufficiently inept, none of these results may follow. Thus,
in Watson v. St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co.,"" a purported conveyance
in trust was so defective that it was decreed a nullity. The reservation
by the settlor in favor of himself and successors, of the power to revoke
the trust in whole or in part, and the instruction-to the trustee not to pay
taxes, collect or disburse rents or care for the estate in any way, failed to
indicate a trust intent and rendered the whole conveyance illusory be-
cause the reserved powers amounted to retention of ownership. 89
Extensive analysis of the nature of a resulting trust is contained
in the two opinions of Mitchell v. Grapes,9 ° wherein the supreme court de-
clared the existence of such a trust, reversing the District Court of Appeal.
In that case three daughters transferred their interest in their mother's
estate to their father on his oral agreement to manage it for them. The
father married again and so arranged his affairs that on his death all his
assets passed to the second wife either by will or as surviving tenant by
the entireties.
An express trust involving realty is required by statute9 to be
created in writing, but resulting and constructive trusts are excepted from
its terms.92 The court of appeal, after a historical review back to the
Statute of Uses, concluded that the facts did not correspond to the typi-
cal modern day purchase money resulting trust.93
The appellate court explained that a purchase money resulting trust
arises when property is conveyed to one person and the purchase price
is paid by another; however, when an owner of land makes a gratuitous
conveyance, a gift rather than a resulting trust is presumed.94 The court
then indicated that relief in the nature of a constructive trust can be ob-
85. FLA. STAT. § 689.07 (1963).
86. McGriff v. McGill, 62 So.2d 28 (Fla. 1952); Elvins v. Seestedt, 141 Fla. 266, 193
So. 54 (1940) ; BOYER, op. cit. supra note 84, § 10.05.
87. FLA. STAT. § 689.071 (1963).
88. 146 So.2d 383 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
89. Ibid.
90. 146 So.2d 591 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962), quashed, 159 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1964).
91. FLA. STAT. § 689.05 (1963).
92. Mitchell v. Grapes, supra note 90. Both opinions agree on this proposition, and
they are obviously correct.
93. 146 So.2d at 594-95. The court listed three circumstances as giving rise to a re-
sulting trust: (1) failure of an express trust; (2) creation of an express trust which does
not exhaust the trust estate; and (3) a purchase money resulting trust. The authorities are
generally in accord. See 4 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY ff 590 (1954).
94. 146 So.2d at 595. Cf. 4 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 93, at 555: "When no payment
has been made, as for example, when the transfer has been gratuitous, the essential basis for
a resulting purchase money trust is absent."
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tained on "clear and convincing proof,"9 5 but stated that since a construc-
tive trust was not relied on, no relief should be granted.
The supreme court, in reversing, stated that the section of the stat-
ute of frauds relating to trusts was inapplicable since the trust involved
here was not of real estate as such but, rather, of an undivided share in
the proceeds from a decedent's estate, and that no question as to the
validity of any of the deeds was involved.96 The court pointed out that
the father had abused his confidential relation and noted the injustice of
permitting the second wife to be enriched at the expense of the plaintiffs. 7
The tone here is descriptive of a constructive trust, utilized to prevent un-
just enrichment,98 but the supreme court did not use that term. Instead,
it spoke generally in terms of a resulting trust and finally stated: "Even
were it not so that this case involves personalty rather than real property,
a resulting trust has been established .. .
Although the ultimate decision has reached a just result, it is lacking
in precise analysis and clear delineation of principles. The opinion discus-
ses with undifferentiated facility many principles of trust law, but it is
difficult to ascertain whether the discussed principle pertains to oral ex-
press trusts of personalty, resulting trusts of personalty, or to construc-
tive trusts generally. The court stated that there was a resulting trust, and
that the subject was personalty, but the emphasis upon breach of the
father's confidential relationship which led to the unjust enrichment of
his second wife suggests that the real basis of the decision was a construc-
tive trust. The opinion would have been more desirable had it forthrightly
been predicted on this latter theory.100
D. Cancellation and Reformation; A Void Deed Is a
Void Deed Is a Void Deed
By far the most significant decision in this area during the past two
years was Reed v. Fain.10 In that case a sister brought an action in equity
95. 146 So.2d at 595.
96. 159 So.2d at 467.
97. Id. at 468.
98. See 146 So.2d at 595 for the comment of the district court of appeal. For discus-
sion of constructive trusts see 4 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 93, 11 594-97.
99. 159 So.2d at 469.
100. Why this was not done is subject only to speculation. The question of the district
court of appeal emphasized that the theory of the complaint was predicated solely on a
resulting trust. It apparently felt obligated to reverse the trial court in the event no resulting
trust were found, although the facts might permit the imposition of a constructive trust.
Mitchell v. Grapes, supra note 90. Perhaps this idea persisted in the supreme court to avoid
its acknowledging the employment of a constructive trust device. Such an attitude is un-
warranted. Every complaint is considered to pray for general relief. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8 (b).
Facts must be pleaded and not theories of law. Ibid. If a judgment or decree is proper it
should not be reversed simply because of an erroneous reason. Escarra v. Winn Dixie Stores,
Inc., 131 So.2d 483, 485 (Fla. 1961). Thus, if the appellate court felt, as it and the supreme
court apparently did, that the decision for the plaintiffs was sustainable on the basis of a
constructive trust rather than a resulting trust, the decision of the trial court should have
been affirmed.
101. 145 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1962). See also 17 U. MIAmi L. REv. 643 (1963), and text ac-
companying notes 138 & 234 infra.
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against her brother to obtain cancellation of two deeds executed twenty-
seven years earlier. The deeds were void as unauthorized conveyances of
homestead property."0 2 The brother defended by asserting the twenty-year
statute of limitations which provides that after the passage of twenty
years from the recording of any deed, such deed becomes valid and effec-
tual against all persons who have not asserted by competent record title
an adverse claim.10 3 The Florida supreme court, overruling its decision
in Thompson v. Thompson,'°4 held that the statute is not applicable to
a void deed or -to a deed transferring homestead in violation of the con-
stitutional provisions regulating homestead conveyances. 0 5
A number of other less significant cases during the two-year period
held: that both the incompetency of the grantor at the time of the execu-
tion of the deed and the grantee's undue influence on the grantor in obtain-
ing the deed may be alleged in the same complaint; ' that a mutual mis-
take of the parties in describing the property is cause for reformation;
107
that while love and affection may be sufficient consideration to validate a
deed, it is not sufficient to support an action in equity by the grantee to
reform the deed; ' 08 that the evidence needed to establish a mutual mistake
need only be clear and convincing and need not prove the mistake beyond
a reasonable doubt;' that a deed executed by an incompetent grantor
is subject to cancellation; "0 and that a deed will not be cancelled because
one of the two subscribing witnesses signed the document after delivery."1
102. The deeds were considered void apparently because they were executed gratuitously
in order to circumvent the descent of the homestead equally to the son and daughter. The
court considered the original conveyance void in its inception, but added that if not void
ab initio, the transaction was void as to the "inchoate interest" of the daughter.
103. FLA. STAT. § 95.23 (1963).
104. 70 So.2d 555 (Fla. 1954). The perplexity of the problem and the unsatisfactory
status of the homestead law is evidenced by the fact that the supreme court first wrote an
opinion adhering to Thompson v. Thompson, and then wrote another opinion overruling it.
145 So.2d at 860 & 864. Both opinions were by a 4:3 majority.
105. 145 So.2d at 871. The court, summarizing, held that the 20 year statute of limita-
tions was not applicable because: (1) the critical deed was void; (2) if not void ab initio it
was void as to the "inchoate" interest in the homestead which became "vested" at the death
of the father; (3) the Legislature did not intend statute § 95.23 to apply to deeds or wills
transferring homestead property; and (4)j statute § 95.23 would be unconstitutional if con-
strued so as to validate instruments executed in contravention of constitutional inhibitions.
This raft of reasons and the general reluctance of the courts to re-examine basic constitutional
provisions in preference to adherence to lines of troublesome homestead decisions are more
likely to produce than allay litigation.
106. Mather-Smith, II v. Fairchild, 135 So.2d 233 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
107. Bevis Constr. Co. v. Grace, 134 So.2d 516 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
108. Harrod v. Simmons, 143 So.2d 717 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
109. Goodstone v. Shamblen, 141 So.2d 8 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
110. Brion v. Raymond, 134 So.2d 507 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961) (chancellor's finding of
competency affirmed).
111. Medina v. Orange County, 147 So.2d 556 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962). The deed in this case
had been voluntarily executed by the grantors in the presence of four witnesses, one of whom
signed the deed before delivery and one of whom signed the deed after delivery to the
grantee. FLA. STAT. § 689.01 (1961) requires that a deed be executed in the presence of two
subscribing witnesses, but the court held this does not mean that such witnesses shali sub-
scribe in the presence of the grantors or in the presence of each other.
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III. ESTATES, DOWER, HOMESTEAD AND FuTURE INTERESTS
A. Defeasible Estates, or the Case of the Not-So-Absolute Fee
In Genet v. Florida East Coast Ry.,"' the court affirmed a decree of
specific performance of "a condition subsequent in a deed which gave
the grantor [an] option to repurchase.., upon the failure of the grantees
to perform the condition.""'  The deed recited that as part of the con-
sideration the grantees would construct a warehouse and business fa-
cilities, and that in the event the property was not so developed within
two years, the property, at the option of the grantor, would be re-sold to
the grantor for the original purchase price plus taxes paid.
It is submitted that although the decision is sound, the case raises
some troublesome problems of proper classification of the interests
created. The deed provision was perhaps a little unusual, and the defend-
ants further complicated the issues by contending that the additional pro-
vision specifying "for grantees' own use and for no other purpose"
constituted an invalid restraint on alienation." 4 The court specifically re-
ferred to the condition subsequent in the deed and to the grantor's right
of re-entry. In the typical fee simple subject to a condition subsequent,
the grantor has the right to re-enter without paying for or repurchasing
the property. Of course, the form of the instant provision is in the nature
of a condition subsequent:"' "In the event.., said property shall become
at the option of the grantor .... ."' However, instead of a simple right
to re-enter or power to terminate, -the grantor was given an option to re-
purchase.
The rule against perpetuities was not discussed, nor was the date
of the deed indicated. If the deed was dated after 1951, then presumably
the "right of re-entry" could not last longer than 21 years."' If this were
treated as a simple option in gross, then presumably it must conform to
the rule against perpetuities."8s In the instant case, the condition was that
112. 150 So.2d 272 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963), cert. denied, 155 So.2d 551 (Fla. 1963).
113. 150 So.2d at 273.
114. Id. at 274. No contention was made that the option in itself or provision for re-
purchase constituted an unlawful direct restraint on alienation. See the comments as to pre-
emptive options in Boyer, Real Property Law, 16 U. MLIAs L. REV. 139, 155 (1961).
Whether the option in the instant case should be classified as a pre-emption may be ques-
tioned since, although it is in favor of the grantor, the condition giving rise to its exercise
is not the desire of the grantee to sell but rather the grantee's breach of the condition as to
improvements.
As to restraints on alienation generally, see BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
§ 22.08 (1959).
115. See generally BOYER, op. cit. supra note 114, § 18.03 (1959).
116. 150 So.2d at 273.
117. FLA. STAT. § 689.18 (1963); BOYE, op. cit. supra note 114, § 22.03 (3). Rights of
re-entry and possibilities of reverter created before the statutory restriction were excepted
from the rule against perpetuities and could last indefinitely.
118. BOYER, FLORDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 35.07 (2) (1959). However, see also
note 114 supra.
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the property be developed within two years, a period of time well within
both the rule against perpetuities and the period restricting the duration of
reverter rights. However, the deed did not expressly impose any time
limit on which the option of re-sale to the grantor had to be exercised.
A sensible construction, of course, would limit this period to a reasonable
time after the breach of condition so as to validate the option or re-entry.
The court made no reference to the time factor, but it is to be noted that
if the "option" were held exercisable beyond the period of the rule and
hence void, ,then the grantees' fee simple would have become absolute.119
Insofar as the restriction to the grantees' own use was concerned,
the court easily disposed of it on alternative bases, stating that the
chancellor might have construed it as only requiring construction for the
grantees' use without later prohibiting alienation, or that he might have
construed it as indeed prohibiting alienation, in which case the restriction
would be void as an unlawful restriction and the grantees' estate would
be free from the illegal restraint.120 In either event, the provision would
be enforceable against the grantees.
B. Dower-A Plaintiff Plea For Male Equality;
Continued Female Favoritism
The conclusion reached in Judge Shannon's opinion is justified
by the facts of this particular case and is consistent with the
literal provisions of the dower statute and the clear preponder-
ance of decisions in point. At this juncture, however, I reaffirm
my dissatisfaction with the present status of dower in Florida.
In view of modern realities and the abundant emancipation of
married women, I have long since ceased to be impressed by
solemn references to the historical sanctity of dower as a peren-
nial favorite of the law; for dower, as presently defined and
implemented in Florida, too often results in gross inequity.
Any suggestion that our current version of dower is somehow
firmly imbedded in righteousness and justice comes with poor
grace in a state which withholds from a surviving husband re-
ciprocal rights by way of curtesy in his deceased wife's estate.
Dower in Florida needs a thorough reappraisal and overhauling,
under sponsorship of the Florida Bar, to remove its grave im-
balances and give it a place of deserved respect in the property
law of our state.121
119. See generally 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY IT 789(2) (1962).
120. Genet v. Florida East Coast Ry., 150 So.2d 272, 274-75 (Fla. 3c Dist.), cert. denied,
155 So.2d 551 (Fla. 1963).
121. Robison v. Krause, 136 So.2d 373, 375 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962) (White, J., concurring
specially).
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Thus spoke Justice White, concurring specially in Robison v.
Krause,'22 another incident in the long history of solicitude and benefi-
cence bestowed on the "poor surviving widow." The decision itself is
not surprising, and may not even be important, in view of present statutes
and previous decisions in the area. It simply held that a separated wife
who, after a ceremonial innocent but bigamous second marriage, lived with
her second "spouse" for a period of ten months and then left upon dis-
covering that her first husband had not divorced her, was not estopped
from claiming dower in her first husband's estate. The court indicated
that an estoppel might be raised in some cases but declined to bar the
widow under the circumstances recited.
Justice White's recognition of the tremendous favoritism exhibited
toward surviving widows is believed most significant. Before reform can
be achieved, there must be recognition that reform is needed. The whole
area of property rights of spouses should be re-examined in the light of
modern circumstances.12
Two recent cases124 held that a widow is entitled to dower upon the
lull value of securities held by a broker on a margin account for the
deceased husband. Hence, in computing the amount of dower no allowance
need be made for the obligation owed by the husband to the broker. The
case is a logical application of In re Payne's Estate125 and Murphy v.
Murphy, 26 previously discussed in an earlier survey, 127 but Justice Barns,
in a dissenting opinion, 28 shows how the contrary case (arising when the
statute was worded differently) 29 of Henderson v. Usher"30 could still be
applied to reach perhaps a fairer... result. Under this approach, the
husband is considered to "own" not the stock or the value of it at the
time of his death, but rather the right to redeem the stock from the
pledge; in other words he owns only the value of the stock less his debt
secured by the pledge.
122. Ibid.
123. See Boyer & Miller, Furthering Title Marketability by Substantive Reforms with
Regard to Marital Rights, 18 U. MixAu L. REv. 561 (1964).
124. Rubin v. Rubin's Estate, 144 So.2d 527 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962); Smith v. Mariner's
Estate, 144 So.2d 870 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
125. 83 So.2d 109 (Fla. 1955).
126. 125 Fla. 855, 170 So. 856 (1936).
127. Boyer, Ankus & Friedman, Survey of Real Property Law, 12 U. MiAMI L. RFv. 499,
509 (1958).
128. Rubin v. Rubin's Estate, 144 So.2d 527, 531 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
129. In 1933, the dower statute was changed so that the interest extended to property
"owned" instead of "possessed" by the husband at the time of his death.
130. 125 Fla. 709, 170 So. 846 (1936).
131. As indicated in the following textual paragraph, presumably the dower interest will
not defeat the rights of a secured creditor. However, by giving the widow a 1/3 interest in
the gross estate, including items whose purchase price is secured by a security transaction, it
is obvious that the rights of children and heirs generally, devisees and unsecured creditors may
be substantially diminished.
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The dower statute was amended in 1963,132 perhaps in consequence
of the above -two cases. It is doubtful, however, that the legislative amend-
ment changes the law in this particular. The amendment appears designed
to protect more clearly and effectively the rights of pledgees, mortgagees
and similar holders of security interests; not to diminish the dower rights
or to enlarge the rights of unsecured creditors, heirs, or devisees. The
former statute contained a brief reference to protecting the security of
a mortgage and the lien of any person in possession of personal property,
and Rubin v. Rubin's Estate 3  pointed out that there was no allegation
that the payment of dower would leave insufficient assets to pay the
broker's indebtedness. The amended statute still provides for the com-
putation of dower on the gross estate, but the provision concerning the
non-impairment of security interests is more detailed and it expressly
includes pledgees. Further, the security interest is protected whether or
not possession is transferred to the security holder.
Other noteworthy cases involving dower or married women generally
include: (1) a decision that a simple endorsement on her husband's note
is not sufficient to authorize a judgment against the wife since consent
must be given in writing with the same formalities applicable to convey-
ances of real estate, and specific property must be pledged in the instru-
ment; 134 (2) a determination that the husband has no property right to
be adjudicated in a free dealership proceeding, and that allegations for
publication of notice to the husband are mandatory but not jurisdic-
tional;.. and (3) a holding that a lease for three years signed only by a
married woman as lessor without ,the joinder of the husband is ineffective
to obligate the tenant for a three year term. 6
The case of Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio 3 7 indicates, perhaps, a less
rabid obsession with granting dower at any cost and authorizes the valida-
tion of ante-nuptial agreements under a number of circumstances. The
court stated that a valid agreement contemplates (1) a fair and reasonable
provision for the wife; or (2) in the absence of such a provision, a full and
frank disclosure of the husband's worth to the wife before her signing; or
(3) if no such disclosure is made, a general and approximate knowledge by
the wife of the prospective husband's property.
132. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-119, amending FLA. STAT. § 731.34 (1961).
133. 144 So.2d 527, 531 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
134. Kovens v. Bluestone, 134 So.2d 547 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961), appeal dismissed, 145
So.2d 473 (Fla. 1962).
135. Application of Jensch, 134 So.2d 285 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961). Query: What is the
effect of non-compliance with mandatory requirements which are not jurisdictional?
136. Frazier v. Hart, 140 So.2d 610 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962), cert. denied, 146 So.2d 753
(Fla. 1962).
137. 143 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1962). Additional proceedings on other matters: 152 So.2d 457
(Fla. 1963),; 157 So.2d 530 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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C. Homestead-Reaffirmation of Outmoded Principles
The recurring frequency with which various aspects of homestead
law has been litigated suggests the inability of that creature as currently
constituted to satisfy the needs of our modern, urban and unstable
society. This is particularly true in the alienation and descent areas where
the fortuitous circumstances relating to the manner of taking title origi-
nally can have such serious consequences on the substantive rights of
spouses and children years later.
Reed v. Fain,"8 already mentioned,' reaffirmed all the judicial
restrictions encrusted on the constitutional provisions, and held void an
intra-family conveyance more than twenty years later. There, a daughter
was successful in setting aside transactions which would have resulted in
the entire property's vesting in her brother at the death of both parents.
Although the constitutional provisions only require the joinder of husband
and wife for a conveyance of the homestead, 4 ° the courts have added the
requirement of consideration and have protected the "inchoate" or ex-
pectancy rights of the children whether adult or minor, dependent or
independent, respectful or disrespectful.' Although in the Reed case no
rights of innocent third parties intervened, it is difficult to see how that
would make any difference if the court really means, as it has said so
often, that the deed is void. The case and the subject in general defy
brief comment, but it is doubtful whether such alienation restrictions on
the part of the home owner serve any useful purpose.
The combination of divorce and rigid homestead provisions often
produce results of questionable social utility. Thus, in Moorefield v.
Byrne,' the court invalidated a purported conveyance between husband
and wife to create an estate by the entireties and held ineffective as to
the homestead the deceased husband's will, which had devised everything
to his second wife. The decision is undoubtedly "correct" according to
established law, but note the circumstances. The decedent had lived in
another state at the time of his divorce; he moved to Florida, acquired
the property in question, and then re-married. Apparently the only
occupants of the Florida homestead were the decedent and his second
wife. Nevertheless, at the death of the decedent, his children of a prior
marriage who had never lived within the state, acquired a vested re-
mainder in his homestead and he was powerless to prevent it.
In Johnson v. Johnson,143 an apparent case of first impression, an
138. 145 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1962), affirming 122 So.2d 322 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
139. See text following note 101 supra and text accompanying n.234 infra.
140. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4.
141. See the discussion and review of the many cases in Reed v. Fain, supra note 138;
BOYER, FLORIDA RFAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 21.03(2) (1959).
142. 140 So.2d 876 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962), cert. denied, 147 So.2d 530 (Fla. 1962).
143. 140 So.2d 358 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
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ante-nuptial agreement based upon a full and fair disclosure was held
valid and effective to relinquish the widow's homestead rights.
D. Homestead Immunity, or Nobody Loves A Creditor
The immunity afforded the homestead from the clutches of creditors
has been extended to the proceeds realized from a voluntary sale of the
homestead realty 144 when such proceeds are intended to be reinvested in
another homestead. There are limitations, however. To be entitled to the
exemption the debtor must show by a preponderance of the evidence a
bona fide intention prior to and at the time of sale to reinvest the proceeds
in another homestead within a reasonable time. The immunity is also
limited to only so much of the proceeds as are intended to be reinvested
in a home. Further, the funds must not be comingled with other monies
of the vendor but must be segregated and held for the sole purpose of
acquiring another homestead." 5
This decision prompted a severe criticism by Justice Drew, whose
dissenting opinion characterized the case as "clear and unmistakably
judicial legislation" which "poses far more questions than it answers.""'
It is submitted that the decision indeed may be litigation-producing, but,
on the other hand, it may prevent an indebted homeowner from being
forever immobilized in his present abode.
E. Headship and Ownership Requirement; The Case oj the
Amorous Debtor
Headship and ownership must be united in one individual for home-
stead status to attach, and there can be only one head of the family for
creditor immunity purposes. In Barnett v. Pan American Sur. Co.,1 7 a
divorced woman and judgment debtor with the custody of her two
children claimed a homestead exemption from execution. During pendency
of the litigation the debtor remarried and the new husband moved into
the debtor's home. Instead of completing the cozy family circle and
affording added protection to the impoverished mother and her helpless
charges the new husband and father, simply by joining the family circle,
shattered the homestead status, and presumably all four were rendered
homeless. The reason, of course, supported by cold logic and a raft of
decisions, is that the new husband and father became the new head of the
family. The wife lost her status as head of the family on her remarriage,
and hence her property was no longer exempt."8
144. Orange Brevard Plumbing and Heating Co. v. La Croix, 137 So.2d 201 (Fla. 1962);
noted in 17 U. MlAm L. REv. 99 (1962).
145. Orange Brevard Plumbing and Heating Co. v. La Croix, supra note 144.
146. 137 So.2d at 207.
147. 139 So.2d 192 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962), appeal dismissed, 150 So.2d 444 (Fla. 1963)1.
148. Ibid.
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Can -the result of the Barnett case possibly be avoided in future in-
stances if on marriage the wife conveys the property to the husband?
The situation is tricky. Difficulties with intra-family conveyances are
quite common and have already been noted. 4 Marriage may be a suffi-
cient consideration to sustain the conveyance, but it is to be noted that the
children of the wife, the former head of the family, will not take a home-
stead interest as lineal descendants of the new husband and foster
father."' However, if such conveyance is considered void, the children
lose to the attaching creditors not only their future inheritance rights to the
homestead but also the present benefit of a family shelter. A clear di-
lemma! 151
Other problems also exist. The wife may not want to lose the
security and control she has experienced by having the title in her name.
It is a loss, however, which, unless she gives up marriage, she will have
to accept if she wants to insulate the property from creditors. The time
of the conveyance presents additional difficulties. If she conveys the
homestead before marriage, she no longer has the ownership to support a
claim of exemption, and her creditors might seek to levy on the property
in the hands of the intended spouse. Further, there is the practical hazard
that the wedding possibly might not materialize. A conveyance made after
the marriage is presumably too late, because the wife loses her headship on
acquiring a husband; hence, the immunity is lost. It would seem that a
possible way out of this last difficulty would be to deliver a fully prepared
deed in escrow to a depositary, the deed to the intended husband to be-
come effective immediately upon the marriage of the parties.
Other creditor cases decided during the period of this survey held
that the failure to resist a forced sale of the homestead does not consti-
tute a waiver of the exemption, 52 and that a divorced wife living with her
minor son is entitled to the exemption although the father also contributes
to the son's support.
153
149. See text accompanying note 138 supra.
150. See FLA. STAT. § 731.27 (1963).
151. The possibility of conveying so as to create a remainder interest in the children with
a life estate in either one or both of the spouses should be considered. See Jones v. Equitable
Life Assur. Society, 126 Fla. 527, 171 So. 317 (1936), upholding a conveyance via a straw
creating a life estate for the husband and wife with remainder to some of the children, point-
ing out laches and slighting the fact that not all the children were getting a remainder
interest. If the "wife" on her impending marriage should make such a conveyance creating
a life estate in her alone, the interest of the children would practically be the same as if she
had not married and had remained the head of the family. This results from the fact that in
either event on her death the children would take the land equally. However, as the principal
case points out, the "wife" does lose her homestead status on marriage; hence her life estate
should be subject to execution for her debts, and there is the further possibility that the con-
veyance of the remainder interest might be regarded as in fraud of creditors and void.
152. White v. Posick, 150 So.2d 263 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963), holding also that the exemp-
tion extends to a detached garage with an unrented overhead apartment, and to an attached
swimming pool and screened patio although on a lot adjacent to the dwelling, since the two
lots were improved as a unit and consisted of less than half an acre.
153. Vandiver v. Vincent, 139 So.2d 704 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
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F. Tax Exemption and Separate Residences
The Supreme Court of Florida, in reversing a district court of appeal,
held that a wife was entitled to a homestead tax exemption on a Florida
residence although her husband had established a Washington domicile
and she was not separated from him.' The Washington, D. C., domicile
was necessitated by the husband's membership on the board of directors
of a District corporation, and there was apparently no disruption of the
marital relationship or abandonment of the Florida home. The attorney
general has cautioned, however, that this case would not entitle a husband
and wife, each maintaining a residence within the state, and maintaining
a congenial marital relationship, to have separate homestead tax exemp-
tions.'55
G. Superiority of Federal Tax Lien
The case of Weitzner v. United States 6 recognized the superiority
of federal tax liens over the homestead interest of the surviving spouse
and children. Hence, the tax lien which was perfected under federal law
before the death of -the taxpayer could be foreclosed and the surviving
widow and children divested of any interest in the homestead. This result
is in accord with established precedent.'57
H. Destructibility of Contingent Remainders-Exceptions
and an Unwise Will
In re Rentz' Estate.. reaffirmed the principle of destructibility of
contingent remainders in Florida but found the principle inapplicable to
the facts under consideration. The decision was obviously correct, and the
law was enunciated clearly and with a thorough understanding of the
concepts involved. The end result is unfortunate, but this is the fault of
the testator or draftsman, not the court.
The will devised "all the rents and profits from the rest of my estate
to my wife and children . . . for life with remainder to my grandchildren,
per stirpes." The testator was survived by a widow, three minor children
ranging in age from 9 to 20, and no grandchildren. When the estate was
liquidated, the sum of $52,385.38 was made available for distribution.
Since the will provision created a joint life estate in the widow and chil-
dren with a remainder in the grandchildren, and since there were no
grandchildren in existence, the remainder was clearly contingent. The
widow renounced her life estate and took dower. This may have reduced
154. Judd v. Schooley, 158 So.2d 514 (Fla. 1963), reversing 149 So.2d 587 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1963).
155. Fla. Att'y Gen. Op. 064-5 (1964).
156. 309 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913 (1963).
157. See generally Ross, Federal Tax Liens-Their Impact on the Law of Real Property,
18 U. ML.mi L. REV. 183, 194 (1963).
158. 152 So.2d 480 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963), cert. denied, 156 So.2d 859 (Fla. 1963).
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the fund at least $17,461.77.' Thus, there would be a little less than
$35,000 to support the three life estates of rather young children and
to be preserved for the unborn remaindermen.
It was urged that the destructibility rule defeated the interests of the
unborn grandchildren, on the theory that the reversion left in the testa-
tor descended to his children who were his heirs, and that the merger of
the life estate and reversion destroyed the contingent remainder. 60 While
recognizing that the principle of destructibility was the established law
of Florida, the court found the instant case within two exceptions to the
rule: (1) the destructibility rule does not apply to personal property; and
(2) merger does not apply initially to destroy contingent remainders
when the life estate and next vested estate in reversion or remainder vest
simultaneously in the same person or persons at the instant the interests
are created.' In such a case, the holder of the reversion and life estate
must convey both interests to a third person before contingent remainders
are destroyed.
The law of the case is correctly articulated but the result is unfortu-
nate. Life estates for three young persons were created in a sum of money
which was not particularly substantial. The income yield would not be
great: possibly $700 per year per person if a straight 6o were realized
and nothing were lost in fees and expenses.6 2 Further, administration
problems are presented. The property was not devised in trust, and one
of the children was to remain a minor for 12 years after the death of the
testator. Will each child be given 1/3 of the corpus on becoming 21 ? Will
he have to account to the court, or will he or his guardian have to post
security for the protection of the remaindermen? And irrespective of the
resolution of these procedural difficulties, the fact remains that the young
children of the testator, presumably along with his widow the chief ob-
jects of his bounty, are being provided for rather poorly, particularly in
their younger years when needs are great for educational and marriage
expenses, while the funds must be preserved for the benefit of unknown
and unborn grandchildren, the procreation of which might even be im-
peded by the impecunious position of their potential parents, -the poorly
provided for life tenants.
159. Since dower is calculated on the gross amount of the estate-see text following
note 124 supra; FLA. STAT. § 731.34 (1963)-it is possible that the dower interest is even
greater. On the other hand, the statement in the case is not too clear and it may mean that
the $52,385.38 is available for distribution and that the widow's dower and other claimants
have already been paid. Regardless of the exact amount left for the children and grand-
children, the general observations as to the unwisdom of the provisions are applicable.
160. As to the destructibility rule generally, see BOYER, op. cit. supra note 115, at
§ 22.04(3). The widow is likewise an heir but since she elected dower her rights as an heir
were also probably barred. See FLA. STAT. § 731.34 (1963), granting dower when the widow
is dissatisfied with her share under the will, or under the law of descent and distribution, or
both.
161. In re Rentz' Estate, supra note 158, at 482-84, and authorities cited therein.
162. But see note 159 supra as to the size of the fund.
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I. Entireties-Application of Familiar Rules
Litigation involving property held by the entireties, both real and
personal, largely involved the application of familiar principles. Of course,
such an estate can only exist between husband and wife. Hence, in Higgins
v. Higgins16 a tenancy in common resulted when both grantees knew that
the man had a different living spouse at the time the title was vested in
both their names. This is the usual rule, but occasionally a different
result is reached where the grantees are in fact not husband and wife.'
As long as the marriage exists between the parties, there can be no
severance of the estate by the act of either, and no partition of the
property will be granted.' 65 This is true although the parties may be
separated pursuant to a separate maintenance decree and the husband
has failed to make monthly payments towards the mortgage indebted-
ness.' 66 However, a home owned by a husband and wife as an estate by
the entireties can be awarded to a wife in a suit for separate maintenance
unconnected with divorce as long as the decree does not affect the title
to the property. 67
As a general rule, an estate by the entireties exists in the proceeds
or derivatives of real property held by the entireties. 68 This means that
the income or proceeds of a sale of entireties real estate is entireties
property, 6' that rentals from entireties real property are entireties
property;170 and that funds resulting from a mortgage of entireties real
estate is entireties property.'7 ' Accordingly, such funds are not subject to
levy by a judgment creditor of one of the spouses unless there has been
a termination of the estate by both spouses. 2
A note and a mortgage can be held by a husband and wife as tenants
by the entireties. In Burke v. Coons,'73 the evidence established an at-
tempted gift of the debt by the husband to the mortgagors, but there
was no attempted gift by the wife who had an equal interest in the debt
and mortgage as tenant by the entireties. It was accordingly held that
163. 146 So.2d 122 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
164. See generally BOYER, op. cit. supra note 115, at § 20.02(5), mentioning a joint
tenancy with right of survivorship and an estoppel to deny a tenancy by the entireties.
165. Zakutney v. Zakutney, 151 So.2d 299 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963); Helsel v. Helsel, 138
So.2d 99 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962); Naurison v. Naurison, 132 So.2d 623 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
166. Naurison v. Naurison, supra note 165.
167. Zakutney v. Zakutney, supra note 165.
168. 26 Am. JUR. Husband & Wife § 77, at 702.
169. Dodson v. National Title Ins. Co., 159 Fla. 371 31 So.2d 402 (1947).
170. White v. White, 42 So.2d 710 (Fla. 1949).
171. Crawford v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 139 So.2d 500 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
The conveyance of entireties property to a corporation does not divest it of its entirety
character as between husband and wife where the spouses are sole owners of the corporation.
Lamoureux v. Lamoureux, 157 Fla. 300, 25 So.2d 859 (1946).
172. Crawford v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., supra note 171.
173. 136 So.2d 235 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961), cert. denied, 140 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1962).
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there was no gift, and after the husband's death the wife was entitled to
foreclose the mortgage on default.
Upon the granting of a final decree of divorce the parties to an
estate by the entireties become tenants in common, 74 and a chancellor
generally has no jurisdiction to order a division of the property." 5 In
Rudolph v. Rudolph, 7 ' the court granted a divorce decree placing owner-
ship of the house in the former husband and wife as tenants in common.
Peculiarly, however, the court provided in the decree that "each party
shall be restrained from transferring his or her interest in the property
until such time as the chancellor may find the conditions have so changed
that such a transfer is in the best interest of all concerned.' 77 The
validity of such a judicial restraint on alienation may be questioned.
IV. EASEMENTS, COVENANTS, WATER LAW AND ZONING
A. Dedication and Prescription-The Road of Questionable Origin
The most interesting easement case during this period was Lovey v.
Escambia County,'78 in which it was held that the county's maintenance
of a road for more than four years raised a conclusive presumption of
dedication although the four year period commenced while the land was
owned by the United States. The case makes a fine distinction between
statutes of repose and statutes of limitations, and concludes that the ap-
plicable four year statute17 9 effectively barred the government's successor
from closing the road.
In 1942, the federal government had acquired the land by eminent
domain' 8° as a naval reservation and retained it until 1956, when the
government conveyed it by quitclaim deed to private owners subject to
all existing easements and rights of way for roads, highways and public
utilities. The federal government had permitted the road to be used by the
general public in the same manner as it had been used prior to govern-
ment acquisition, and in 1953 the county reconstructed the road and
thereafter maintained it. In 1959, the county passed a resolution recog-
nizing that it was maintaining the road as a permissive easement and that
174. Weinstein v. Weinstein, 148 So.2d 737 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963); Wilburn v. Wilburn,
143 So.2d 518 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
175. Ibid.
176. 146 So.2d 397 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
177. Id. at 400.
178. 141 So.2d 761 (Fla. 1st Dist.), cert. denied, 147 So.2d 530 (Fla. 1962.)
179. FLA. STAT. § 337.31 (1963), providing that when a county, municipality, or the
state road department maintains or keeps in repair a road continuously and uninterruptedly
for four years, such road shall be deemed to be dedicated.
180. This fact is brought out by the dissent, 141 So.2d 761, 768, pointing out that as a
result of the condemnation the federal government acquired an absolute and unqualified fee
simple title so that no significance should attach to the fact that there was a roadway exist-
ing on the premises prior to the government's acquisition.
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it would be closed at the request of the owners furnishing a specific right
of way.18
Under these facts a divided appellate court upheld the chancellor's
determination that there was a completed dedication of the road to the
extent that it had been actually improved and maintained by the county.
8 2
The four-year statute' 3 was the basis of the decision, but reference to the
deed by which the government divested itself of title may indicate an
alternative basis of either estoppel or prior recognition by the govern-
ment of the public's right and a conveyance subject thereto.'84
The court stated specifically that the statute did not depend upon
adverse possession or prescription but instead provided an alternative
method of dedication.8 5 It classified the statute as one of repose and then
stated that the ultimate effect of both statutes of limitations and of
repose is the same. However, the court then explained that if the sover-
eign's rights depended upon the right to plead a statute of limitations,
such right inures to the benefit of the sovereign's grantee or successor,
but if the sovereign's defense rests upon sovereign immunity (as in the
instant case), such immunity is personal to the sovereign and does not
inure to its successor. 86
This "novel" interpretation of the statute was the subject of a
vigorous dissent by Justice Sturgis.'"' He asserted that implicit in the
majority's construction was the proposition that the statute might be
invoked against the federal government, a consequence unsupported by
existing case law. He criticized the majority's attempt to distinguish the
statute on principles of dedication, rather than prescription or adverse
possession, as a subtle distinction "more apparent than real, a child of
legal legerdemain and gobbledygook."'8 8 Justice Sturgis concluded that
the principle that when title to land is in the United States, no rights by
prescription or adverse possession can be acquired by the legislation of a
state, was an overriding principle applicable to dedication as well.
181. This act of disclaimer is also brought out by the dissent. See 141 So.2d 761, 767.
The chancellor nullified this county resolution on the basis that it did not conform to the
procedure for closing existing public roads. 141 So.2d 761, 770. This is also criticized by the
dissent on the basis that there was no actual or existing dedicated public road and the
county resolution acknowledged as much.
182. Lovey v. Escambia County, supra note 178.
183. See note 179 supra.
184. These propositions are also disputed by the dissent on the basis that the recitation
in the deed is routine and would not be effective to create roads which did not exist, and
because there was no proof of dedication of this road effective against the United States, the
recital in the deed would have no effect.
185. Lovey v. Escambia County, 141 So.2d 761, 763-64 (Fla. 1st Dist.), cert. denied,
147 So.2d 530 (Fla. 1962).
186. 141 So.2d at 764-65.
187. Id. at 767.
188. Id. at 774.
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The dissent appears to be the sounder opinion. Although the
majority's interpretation of the statute may be acceptable in an action
where the federal government is not a defendant, it seems quite doubtful
if the same rationale would prevail in a proceeding against the United
States directly.'8 9 Since the statutory "presumption of dedication" depends
upon overt acts by a local governmental authority plus the passage of
time, the analogy to an ordinary statute of limitations seems strong.
B. Miscellaneous Easements and Licenses
Additional cases involving easements and licenses held that: (1) an
implied easement of necessity was created in favor of plaintiff's land
when a common grantor had conveyed both plaintiff's and defendant's
adjoining land and plaintiff's land had no access to a public road, such
easement being limited to reasonable length and width;"'0 (2) the statu-
tory easement of necessity cannot be created unless the land is used for
one of the purposes specified in the statute;' 9 ' (3) the width of a prescrip-
tive roadway easement includes shoulders and ditches actually used but
not shoulders and ditches needed but not used;' 92 (4) a mandatory in-
junction may issue to compel the removal of a dwelling in violation of a
set-back covenant; 9 3 and (5) a license granted to a power company to
install anchors, although conditionally revocable, required the owner to
inform the company of the owner's building plans so that the company
could intelligently relocate the anchors.
C. Covenants-The Case of the Fairly Permanent Depot
After previously having lost in an attempt to recover the land
following the grantee railroad's removal of its depot, 9 ' the plaintiff, the
successor in interest to the original grantor, brought an action for damages
for breach of covenant. The deed had recited a consideration of "one
dollar and the permanent maintaining of a passenger and freight depot."
The deed did not contain a reverter clause. After adhering to the stipula-
tion for seventy-five years, the railroad moved the depot to a more suitable
location. The appellate court, in affirming a summary decree for the
defendant, agreed that "permanent" does not mean "perpetual," and
hence the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief. 9 '
189. Indeed, the majority seems to recognize this in their discussion of sovereign im-
munity. See text accompanying note 186 supra.
190. Hayes v. Reynolds, 132 So.2d 781 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
191. Hunt v. Smith, 137 So.2d 232 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962). The purposes specified in FLA.
STAT. § 704.01(2) (1963), are: dwelling, agricultural, timber raising or cutting, or stockraising.
192. Grenell v. Scott, 134 So.2d 866 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
193. Daniel v. May, 143 So.2d 536 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
194. Herschberg v. Florida Power & Light Co., 137 So.2d 834 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
195. Robb v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 117 So.2d 534 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960). The case is
briefly noted in Boyer, Real Property Law, 16 U. MiAmi L. Rav. 139, 156 (1961).
196. Robb v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 154 So.2d 871 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
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D. Covenants-Permissible Use and Termination Problems
A number of cases dealing with restrictive covenants addressed
themselves to the problem of the type of use permitted under the particu-
lar covenant. These cases held that: (1) a prohibition against garages ex-
cept on the rear one-third of the lot was not violated by carports or
garages constructed as integral parts of dwellings and conforming archi-
tecturally thereto, but in the instant case there was insufficient evidence
that the carports and garages were in fact integral parts of the building
and conformed architecturally; 197 (2) a municipality was authorized to
divert for roadway purposes portions of land which had been deeded to
the municipality for park purposes;' (3) a prohibition against business
except as "directly concerned with and incidental to each individual
apartment house, apartment hotel, hotel club, or pool and cabana" pre-
cluded an apartment house owner from using a restaurant, cocktail
lounge, cabana and swimming pool for the benefit of the general public; 9'
and (4) a lease restriction prohibiting the landlord from leasing to a
tenant whose principal business was a bakery was not violated by a prior
lease to a supermarket which subsequently granted a concession -to a
bakery.200
Among the cases involving the termination of covenants, Harwick v.
Indian Creek Country Club2"' held ineffective an attempt by some of the
owners of a subdivision to release by mutual agreement single family
restrictions in their deeds. The purported release was held ineffective
because it was not executed by all the owners of the subdivision. This
result is sound, since the imposition of such restrictive covenants benefits
and burdens all the lots to the same extent. In another case, 20 2 the court
also indicated, in accordance with general equitable principles, that viola-
tion of a covenant by the plaintiffs constituted reason for non-enforcement
in equity on the basis of waiver, unclean hands, or, possibly, estoppel.2 11
E. Water Law-Erosion and Related Doctrines
The legal principles which relate to changing land boundaries oc-
casioned by the action of the water are relatively simple, but the appli-
cations are rather difficult because of the problem of determining whether
the changes were sudden and perceptible or gradual and imperceptible.
In Municipal Liquidators, Inc. v. Tench, °4 the critical issue was whether
land formerly bordering Tampa Bay became submerged by avulsion or
197. Crowl v. McDuffie, 134 So.2d 542 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
198. Kumick v. City of St. Petersburg, 136 So.2d 5 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
199. Ball-Hamilton Corp. v. Jones, 147 So.2d 610 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
200. Norwood Shopping Center, Inc. v. MKR Corp., 135 So.2d 448 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
201. 142 So.2d 128 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
202. Crowl v. McDuffie, supra note 197.
203. Ibid.
204. 153 So.2d 728 (Fla. 2d Dist.), cert. denied, 157 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1963).
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erosion. If by avulsion, the title of the former owner was not lost; if by
erosion, the title was lost. The appellate court, in affirming the trial court,
held that the evidence sustained the finding that the land was lost by
erosion, that it thus became vested in the Trustees of the Internal Im-
provement Fund and that the Trustees were authorized to convey the
eroded land up to the bulkhead line to the present upland owner.
Conoley v. Naetzker, °5 involved the opposite situation where form-
erly submerged land became dry and the Trustees of the Internal Improve-
ment Fund, claiming title, conveyed it to plaintiffs pursuant to statutory
procedure."' The plaintiffs brought ejectment against their neighboring
lakefront owners, who alleged that the withdrawal of the water was slow
and imperceptible and that under the doctrine of reliction title to the
land in dispute vested in them (the defendants).2o7 In affirming judgment
for the plaintiffs, the appellate court held that since the defendants were
not denied an opportunity to make a direct attack on the Trustee's deter-
mination that the parcel was reclaimed land"0 8 rather than relicted land,
they were not permitted to make a collateral attack on this determina-
tion by challenging the title of the Trustee's grantee.
F. Access Rights; Bulkhead Lines
The right of all riparian owners bordering a non-navigable lake to
use the entire lake for boating and similar purposes was reaffirmed in
Conrad v. Whitney.20 9 Accordingly, the court upheld a mandatory injunc-
tion requiring the removal of fill which had been placed across a bayou
in such a way as to interfere with access rights.
In litigation involving bulkheads, Gies v. Fischer210 held that bulkhead
lines could be established over privately held submerged lands so as to
prevent filling, and that a bulkhead line could be established only at a
point where further outward extension of land would constitute inter-
ference with the servitude in favor of commerce and navigation. In an-
205. 137 So.2d 6 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
206. See note 208 infra.
207. Reliction refers to the gradual recession of water; accretion to the gradual building
up of land. In either event title to the new land belongs to the adjoining owner. BOYER,
FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 13.07(2) (1959).
208. Title to reclaimed land is vested in the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund.
FLA. STAT. § 253.36 (1963). The lake involved was navigable. FLA. STAT. § 253.37 (1963)
confers upon the Trustees the power to dispose of such lands and provides that the right to
purchase shall be first given to an adjacent owner who desired to complete or square up any
fractional section which he owns.
209. 141 So.2d 796 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
The civil law rule authorizing a riparian owner on a non-navigable lake to use the whole
lake subject to the similar rights of other riparian owners was announced in Duval v.
Thomas, 114 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1959), approving 107 So.2d 148 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958) Duval v.
Thomas is discussed in a note, 14 U. Mtmai L. REv. 689 (1960).
210. 146 So.2d 361 (Fla. 1962).
REAL PROPERTY
other case,2 1 an upland owner's request for the establishment of a bulk-
head line and permit to fill was denied on the basis that the proposed fill
would produce materially adverse effects; the constitutionality of the act
as thus applied was upheld.
G. Zoning-Exception and Variance Distinguished-Rezoning
Several cases during the reported biennium involved the distinc-
tion between legislative and administrative action at the lower level and
the proper procedure for seeking review from adverse initial decisions.
In Mayflower Property, Inc. v. City of Ft. Lauderdale,212 the property
owner sought review of the denial of a rezoning application. He did not
seek an exception or variance from the Board of Adjustment.
Rezoning, as the court pointed out, is a legislative matter and is
determined by the city commission or other legislative body. The Board
of Adjustment, on the other hand, is an administrative body and may be
empowered to grant a variance or exception when properly authorized to
do so by statute.
In addition to noting this distinction, the Mayflower case also ex-
plained the difference between an exception and a variance. A variance
is relief granted from the literal enforcement of a zoning ordinance per-
mitting otherwise unauthorized use when literal enforcement of the
ordinance as written would result in unnecessary hardship or practical
difficulty to the property owner.21 An exception, on the other hand, is a
departure from the general provisions of the zoning ordinance granted
by legislative process under express provisions of the enactment itself.
If the facts or circumstances specified in the ordinance are found to
exist, then either on a direct application, or on appeal from an administra-
tive order enforcing the ordinance, a Board of Adjustment may grant
an exception.214
The court then concluded that although the applicable statute pur-
ported to give the Board of Adjustment power to grant special exceptions
and variances, the only standards set forth were applicable to variances
while no standards and guidance rules were provided for exceptions.2 15
Further, in the instant case the requested relief, if granted, would have
211. Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Nav. Control Authority, 154 So.2d 181 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1963).
212. 137 So.2d 849 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
213. Mayflower Property, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, supra note 212; Board of
Adjustment of Ft. Lauderdale v. Kremer, 139 So.2d 448 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
214. Cases cited supra note 213.
215. The standard for a variance is unnecessary hardship or practical difficulty. May-
flower Property, Inc. v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, supra note 212. The hardship or difficulty
must be unique to the property involved. If the hardship is one that is common to the area,
then a variance is not justified but the proper remedy is to seek a change in the zoning.
Board of Adjustment of Ft. Lauderdale v. Kremer, 139 So.2d 448 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
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had the effect of placing the plaintiff's property in a different zone. The
board has no such power, since such a drastic change can be made only
by an amendatory ordinance. Hence, the plaintiff had exhausted his ad-
ministrative remedies and judicial review was proper."' 0
H. Rezoning and Review
When the action at the lower level involves rezoning as distinguished
from administrative determinations, as previously pointed out,... judicial
review can and should be obtained without first resorting to the Board of
Adjustment. Thus, in Village of Pembroke Pines v. Zitreen,18 it was held
that where the property owner was unsuccessful in an application for re-
zoning it was not necessary first to seek relief from the Board of Adjust-
ment before attacking the ordinance by judicial proceedings. Further, in
the extensively litigated case of Oka v. Cole,219 the supreme court upheld
a rezoning ordinance applicable only to one parcel of land under the
"fairly debatable" rule,22° and concluded that the "self-imposed" hard-
ship limitation 22' did not apply to legislative discretion and that the
particular ordinance was not invalid as "spot zoning. 2 2 A similar situa-
tion and result was reached in Sarasota County v. Walker,22 3 in which the
court upheld the rezoning classification and stated that a change in the
area or similar factors are not the only legitimate bases for rezoning.
I. Estoppel; Miscellaneous Applications
A limitation on the power of the municipality to change its decision
and revoke a building permit was imposed in Sakolsky v. City of Coral
Gables.224 Although the land in question had been zoned for apartments,
216. Mayflower Property, Inc. v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, supra note 212.
217. Cases cited supra note 215.
218. 143 So.2d 660 (Fla. 2. Dist. 1962).
219. 145 So.2d 233 (Fla. 1962).
Earlier reports were: 107 So.2d 45 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958); 131 So.2d 757 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1961), invalidating the amendatory ordinance as spot zoning.
220. The principle involved is that if the reasonableness of the legislative classification
is fairly debatable, it should be upheld.
In the instant case the property involved was located on a zonal boundary, property
on one side being zoned for apartments while the property on the other side was restricted
to single family residences. The controversial parcel had remained vacant since enactment of
the comprehensive zoning ordinance in 1930, and the evidence showed that the mortgage
market for a single family residence on the site was extremely limited. The amendatory
ordinance authorized a multiple-unit dwelling.
But when the court finds no basis for differentiating the plaintiff's land from that of his
neighbors, then the classification is not fairly "debatable" but arbitrary, discriminatory and
void. J. H. S. Homes, Inc. v. County of Broward, 140 So.2d 621 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
221. Josephson v. Autrey, 96 So.2d 784 (Fla. 1957) stated that a zoning board, author-
ized to grant variances on the basis of unique or unnecessary hardship, was precluded from
exercising such power when the hardship was self-created.
222. Oka v. Cole, 145 So.2d 233 (Fla. 1962). The district court of appeal had invalidated
the ordinance as spot zoning. See note 219 supra.
223. 144 So.2d 345 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
224. 151 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1963), quashing 139 So.2d 504 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
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the city had a long-standing policy of limiting the height of such build-
ings. After a public hearing, at which one hundred objectors by counsel
were fully heard, the commission, by a majority vote, granted the peti-
tioner a permit to build a twelve story luxury apartment building. In
reliance on the building permit, the petitioner changed his position
materially and expended considerable sums of money. Thirty-five days
after the permit was authorized,225 the city commission, following a change
in membership, voted to rescind the permit. The supreme court, conclud-
ing that its former decision in Miami Shores Village v. William N. Brock-
way Post,226 was erroneous, held that the principle of equitable estoppel
should apply and that the city was precluded from rescinding the per-
mit.22
7
Other zoning cases, generally in accord with established principles,
held that: (1) a private person is not entitled to enjoin or nullify a
variance granted to another in the absence of a showing of a special
injury differing in kind from that suffered by the public at large; 228
(2) an allegation that an adjoining landowner has violated side line set-
back restrictions so as to violate the open space requirements of the
ordinance is a sufficient allegation of special damages differing from
those of the community at large;229 (3) a county rezoning resolution,
being purely legislative and not quasi-judicial in character, is reviewable
not by certiorari but by a suit in equity;"'0 (4) review from the circuit
court is by appeal and not by certiorari; 2"' (5) a substantial change in
the character of the neighborhood may render a ordinance void as to par-
ticular land; 23 2 and (6) an ordinance enacted to preserve the unique
status of a town, which had existed for many years, as a peaceful and
secluded community, and which restricted plaintiff's property to single
225. The shortness of the interval between the actions of the city commission, the
knowledge that one commissioner was going to be replaced, and the heat of the controversy
engendered are revealed in the opinion of the district court of appeal, supra note 224.
226. 156 Fla. 673, 24 So.2d 33 (1945), involving cancellation of a permit to build a
Legion Hall six weeks after it was granted and finding no estoppel.
227. Sakolsky v. City of Coral Gables, 151 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1963). See also City of
Miami v. State, 132 So.2d 474 (Fla. 3d Dist.), cert. denied, 136 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1961), holding
that a building permit issued under a variance and pending litigation could be revoked.
Cf. Cotney v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Brevard County, 140 So.2d 877 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1962), requiring removal of addition to existing building started prior to adoption of zoning
ordinance and without a permit.
228. S. A. Lynch Inv. Corp. v. City of Miami, 151 So.2d 858 (Fla. 3d Dist.), cert.
denied, 155 So.2d 695 (Fla. 1963).
229. Hudson v. Tabas, 136 So.2d 243 (Fla. 3d Dist.), cert. denied, 142 So.2d 95 (Fla.
1962), approving of the injunction requiring removal of the offending addition, but reversing
the chancellor's decision to strike the allegations relating to damages.
230. Harris v. Goff, 151 So.2d 642 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963). The court pointed out that
chapter 176 of the Florida Statutes, relating to municipal zoning ordinances, is not applicable
to counties and hence the statutory review of certiorari therein providing for a trial de novo
is not applicable to zoning ordinances enacted by a county.
231. Phillips v. County of Dade, 133 So.2d 573 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961), cert. denied, 138
So.2d 333 (Fla. 1962).
232. City of Miami Beach v. Rosen, 140 So.2d 317 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
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family residences was upheld as not being clearly arbitrary or unreason-
able.2"'
V. ADVERSE POSSESSION, DEDICATION, TAX TITLES
AND EMINENT DOMAIN
A. Adverse Possession and Limitations
The most significant case in this area, Reed v. Fain,"4 held that a
twenty-year statute of limitations did not apply to a void conveyance of
the homestead. Other cases held that: (1) a title acquired by adverse pos-
session must be established by a high degree of certainty, clarity and
positiveness, and that payment of taxes alone is not sufficient; 235 (2) ad-
verse possession under color of title requires good faith and an honest
belief in the validity of the purported conveyance, 236 and (3) a twenty-
year limitations period applied to the enforcement of special assessment
liens of the city of Miami.23 7
B. Dedication
As previously discussed, 8 the most interesting dedication case in-
volved the presumption of dedication arising from a county's road main-
tenance for four years,3 9 and held that an alternative method of dedica-
tion rather than prescription was involved and therefore the statutory
four year period could commence while the land was owned by the
United States.24° Other cases involved the application of traditional
principles, 241' and although an occasional disagreement may arise as to
233. Gautier v. Town of Jupiter Island, 142 So.2d 321 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962). The ordi-
nance authorized business uses on only a comparatively small area, and a large part of that
was devoted to a golf course.
234. 145 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1962). The case is discussed in text accompanying notes 101,
138-41 supra.
235. Culbertson v. Montanbault, 133 So.2d 772 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
236. Simpson v. Lindgren, 133 So.2d 439 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
237. Ware v. City of Miami, 132 So.2d 446 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961), writ discharged, 140
So.2d 302 (Fla. 1962). The city charter did not contain an express provision limiting the
period for enforcing special assessment liens. The court concluded that FLA. STAT. § 95.021
(1963), applying provisions of existing law barring an action if not commenced within twenty
years to actions by the state or municipal corporations, would be applicable in the absence
of a specific provision. The court also concluded that § 95.28, limiting the lien of a mortgage
to twenty years, would likewise apply where the assessment lien had attributes similar to
those of a mortgage.
238. See text following note 178 supra.
239. FLA. STAT. § 337.31 (1963).
240. Lovey v. Escambia County, 141 So.2d 761 (Fla. 1st Dist.), cert. denied, 147 So.2d
530 (Fla. 1962).
241. Roberts v. Town of Jupiter, 136 So.2d 233 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961), (acceptance of the
offer to dedicate the streets in question by user of connecting streets) ; West Hialeah Mfg. Co.
v. City of Hialeah, 134 So.2d 505 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961), cert. dism'd, 142 So.2d 92 (Fla. 1962)
(city had failed to accept offer to dedicate before there was a revocation); Highland Beach
Realty Co. v. Turner, 139 So.2d 467 (Fla. 2d Dist.), appeal dismissed, 146 So.2d 749 (Fla.
1962), cert. discharged, 148 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1962), also involving acceptance and revocation,
and discussed in text accompanying notes 245 & 246 infra.
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the effect of particular conduct,242 there should be no dispute as to the
rules themselves.
Worthy of note is Highland Beach Realty Co. v. Turner,245 in which
the developer filed a plat of a subdivision and posted a cash bond to guar-
antee construction of the streets and other public improvements indicated
on the plat. The town "approved" the plat but did not formally "accept"
the dedication of the streets.244 The land was mortgaged by a metes and
bounds description and the mortgagee did not join in the execution of the
plat. Upon default, the mortgage was foreclosed without the joinder of the
town. Grantees from the purchaser at the foreclosure sale brought an ac-
tion to declare the cash bond forfeited and to have either the town com-
plete the construction or the plaintiffs acquire the benefit of the forfeited
bond so that they could complete it.
In reversing a summary decree in favor of the plaintiffs, the appel-
late court stated that it was error to deny the developer's motion to dismiss.
Because the opinion contained many statements relating to principles
of dedication, it is a little difficult to determine the precise basis of the
decision. Conceivably, its primary basis was the inadequacy of the plain-
tiff's pleading. For example, the court referred to the allegation that the
town approved the plat, and added that there was no allegation of ac-
ceptance. 45 If the dismissal was based on the non-allegation of acceptance,
perhaps an amended pleading could have been filed and the suit com-
menced again. Since acceptance can be informal 4 as well as formal,
might not an acceptance be implied from the conduct of the city in at-
tempting to guarantee completion of the street construction? If the city
had not accepted -the dedication, it would seem incongruous for it to
require the developer to post a bond to guarantee performance of con-
struction on strictly private land.
The court also stated that foreclosure of the mortgaged land under the
metes and bounds description acted as a revocation of -the offer to dedi-
cate.247 It is obviously true that the platting could have had no obliga-
tory effect on the prior mortgagee who did not join in the execution of
the plat. However, it would seem that such purported platting and dedi-
cation should be regarded as voidable only and not void as to the mort-
242. For a discussion of Highland Beach Realty Co. v. Turner, see text accompanying
notes 245 & 246 infra.
243. 139 So.2d 467 (Fla. 2d Dist.), appeal dismissed, 146 So.2d 749 (Fla.), cert. dis-
charged, 148 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1962).
244. Filing the plat in Florida is considered as an offer of dedication which must be
accepted for the dedication to become complete. Approving the plat is not equivalent to
acceptance under the general Florida law. See BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
846, 851 (1959).
245. 139 So.2d at 471.
246. See, for example, Roberts v. Town of Jupiter, 136 So.2d 233 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961),
finding acceptance by user of connecting streets in subdivision.
247. 139 So.2d at 470.
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gagee, thus giving the mortgagee the option of ratifying the plat and dedi-
cation. The significance of pleading may again be indicated by the court's
statement:
[W]hen the foreclosure was completed and the property sold,
the purchaser acquired title and ownership to the entire prop-
erty, including the streets and without any restrictions on ac-
count of the plat whatsoever. Therefore, when this purchaser
sold the property to the plaintiffs, or their grantors, according
to the plat, the purchasers at the foreclosure sale remained the
owners of such streets, since there is no allegation in the com-
plaint that such purchasers have conveyed or dedicated the
streets, after having thus acquired title to them.248
Though it may be admitted that the conveyance in reference to the
prior plat by the purchaser at the foreclosure sale would not amount to
an offer to dedicate the public lands appearing on the plat, it would seem
that such conduct might estop the one so conveying from denying that he
affirmed the prior offer to dedicate or that he is deemed to have ratified
the prior plat.
The result in the Turner case, although perhaps sustainable on con-
siderations of individual principles, leads to questionable cumulative
results. The defaulting dedicator presumably will be able to recover his
bond or deposit. The city, which attempted to guarantee street construc-
tion, ends up with neither easement nor title to the streets so that it
does not have even the right to build them itself should it so desire. The
purchasers at the foreclosure sale, apparently desirous of affirming the
plat, and having conveyed platted lots, end up with long non-dedicated
strips of land probably subject to private easements in favor of the
grantees of the lots. The grantees of the individual lots may have private
easements over the "platted" streets but they are just as powerless as the
city insofar as compelling the construction of such streets or rendering
the easements useable and practical. And the plat continues on record
specifically unrevoked, with the result that even more purchasers might be
misled.
C. Taxes and Tax Titles
Three tax titles having their respective origins in 1948, 1949 and
1957 proceedings were declared void on the basis of familiar principles.2 9
The cases thus serve as a reminder of the risks involved and the necessity
248. Ibid.
249. Stewart v. Gadarian, 141 So.2d 289 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962), invalidating a 1948 tax
deed because the first date of publication of notice was less than 28 days from the date of the
tax sale; Garner v. Larkin, 132 So.2d 298 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961), invalidating a 1942 tax deed
because the taxes had in fact been paid pursuant to an assessment under a different descrip-
tion; and Holmes v. Kiser, 138 So.2d 782 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962), invalidating a 1957 tax deed
because the legal description of the land was too vague for precise identification and also
because of the clerk's failure to follow statutory notice requirements.
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for meticulous scrutiny in the checking of tax titles. In other litigation it
was held that: (1) a tax deed destroys the separate mineral estate when
the minerals were not separately assessed; 50 (2) a levy for the operation
of a fire prevention and control district was a general tax and not a
special assessment, so that the homestead taxation exemption was appli-
cable; 215 (3) a tax certificate cannot be foreclosed when the land has been
redeemed from the nonpayment;25 and (4) land leased from a port au-
thority but used for private business purposes was not exempt from taxa-
tion.258
D. Eminent Domain-Exercise of the Power
A number of condemnation cases concerned the proper exercise
of the power of eminent domain and its relationship to other govern-
mental powers. In City of Miami v. Wolfe, 254 for example, it was shown
that the real purpose behind the condemnation of waterfront land was
to thwart the riparian owner in his attempt to purchase bay bottom
land in accordance with the statutory policy 255 of selling such lands to
the upland owner. Through condemnation, the city desired to become the
fee simple owner with the concomitant right to purchase the bay bottom
lands, and had refused a gratuitous offer of a permanent easement for
road purposes on condition that it refrain from interfering with the land-
owner's attempts to purchase the bay bottoms. It was accordingly held
that the action was brought in bad faith, that it constituted a gross abuse
of discretion, and should have been dismissed.256
Dade County sought to limit its liability for street expansion pur-
poses by listing certain streets for prospective highway construction, and
then passing a resolution and later an ordinance preventing abutting
owners from erecting improvements within the bounds of the contem-
plated highway areas without waiving their right to compensation for the
improvements in the event of a later 'taking for highway purposes. In
Cook v. Di Domenico,257 the landowner was held entitled to a writ of
mandamus requiring the issuance of a building permit without waiver of a
right to compensation when the resolution concerning prospective im-
provements had been passed nine years before and no plans had been
made for the actual construction. The court concluded that there is surely
some limit to the period that one can be deprived of the lawful use of his
property without waiving compensation for new improvements. In effect,
250. Lee v. Carpenter, 132 So.2d 433 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
251. St. Lude County-Ft. Pierce Fire Prevention & Control Dist. v. Higgs, 141 So.2d
744 (Fla. 1962).
.252. Skillman v. Baker, 142 So.2d 113 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
253. Illinois Grain Corp. v. Schleman, 144 So.2d 329 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
254. 150 So.2d 489 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
255. FLA. STAT. § 253.12(1) (1963).
256. City of Miami v. Wolfe, supra note 254.
257. 135 So.2d 245 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
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the action of the county was an unauthorized exercise of the police power
in an effort to circumvent the necessity of condemnation.
In a case of apparent first impression, City of Dania v. Central &
So. Florida Flood Control Dist."'s held that the fact that land was owned
by a city did not itself exempt it from condemnation by a flood control
district. The precise holding was on the technical ground that there was
no showing that the use contemplated by the flood control district would
materially interfere with the public use as a city dump, to which the
land was subjected by the city.2"9 Previously, the majority of the court
had indicated that if the intended use would destroy the existing public
use, eminent domain could not be used to acquire such land in the absence
of legislative authority conferred expressly or by necessary implication.2"'
The police power was held paramount to the power of eminent do-
main in Dudley v. Orange County,2" a case in which the plaintiff land-
owners had sought injunctive relief because of flooding occasioned by
civil defense dams and highway construction. The court noted some
distinguishing features between the two sovereign powers, including the
fact that a restriction or taking under the police power requires no com-
pensation whereas a taking under eminent domain does, and also that in
the exercise of the police power an owner's right are taken or restricted
because such unrestricted use or enjoyment is inimical to the public
welfare, whereas under eminent domain the property is transferred to the
public to be enjoyed and used by the public.262 The court then observed
that mandatory injunctions are regarded with disfavor and the courts
are reluctant to issue them, and finally concluded that the plaintiffs were
not entitled to damages, either, since there was no showing that the
flooding was permanent rather than temporary and caused by a natural
disaster.26  In another case264 involving the condemnation of a utility
easement, it was held that the condemnor could not take the right to cut
future danger trees265 on land outside the easement boundaries without
describing the particular land to which the right would apply.
E. Eminent Domain-Damages
The supreme court of Florida, in reversing a case noted in the
previous survey, 2 6 held that the property owner was entitled to inspect
258. 134 So.2d 848 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
259. Id. at 854-56.
260. Id. at 851-52.
261. 137 So.2d 859 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962), appeal dismissed, 146 So.2d 379 (Fla. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 959 (1963).
262. Id. at 861-62.
263. Dudley v. Orange County, supra note 261.
264. Florida Power Corp. v. Griffin, 144 So.2d 104 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962), motion denied,
150 So.2d 270 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
265. A danger tree is defined as any tree in the proximity of a transmission line, which
if felled, or upon falling, could fall within five feet of any conductor or other facility included
within such transmission line. 144 So.2d at 104.
266. State Road Dep't v. Shell, 122 So.2d 215 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960), noted at 16 U. MrIsI
L. REv. 139, 165 (1961).
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the work sheets of the appraisers hired by the condemning state road
department.2 67 This case, by making available the "work product" of the
condemnor, should greatly benefit the landowner and may lead to settle-
ment and avoidance of litigation. The court recognized that the rule ad-
vanced was contrary to the usual discovery rule applicable in ordinary
litigation, but concluded that policy considerations justify this contrary
rule.26 The defendant in condemnation cases is in no way at fault, and the
object of the litigation is to determine just compensation. The determina-
tion of a just amount should be of equal concern to both parties and the
government should not be permitted or encouraged to take advantage of
the property owner by making it more difficult for him to establish
value. The decision appears most salutary.
The determination of the proper amount of compensation is the
function of the jury, whose discretion is limited by the minimum and
maximum amounts set by the testifying experts. 69 Further, the fact that
the jury awards an amount less than that which the condemnor was re-
quired to deposit in the court registry prior to trial does not render the
verdict so contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence that it should
be set aside when the amount awarded is higher than the minimum ap-
praisal of testifying experts.' On the other hand, if the verdict is below
the lowest value fixed by the evidence, the award cannot be upheld.
71
Principles of surrender and termination in landlord and tenant law
were controlling in Orange State Oil Co. v. Jacksonville Expressway
Authority,' 72 a controversy over the apportionment of a condemnation
award. There was a partial taking of the land involved and substantial
damage to existing buildings so as to require a complete redesigning and
construction for continued use of the premises. The lease had no condem-
nation provision. The tenant abandoned the premises, notified the land-
lord that he did not wish to reopen his business, assumed that his rental
obligations would cease, and offered to cooperate in the condemnation
proceedings. The landlord made no reply to the tenant's notice and both
the landlord and tenant were made defendants in the condemnation suit.
The court held that the landlord was entitled to all of the compensa-
tion award,273 and its decision seems justified. Contrary to the tenant's
267. Shell v. State Road Dep't, 135 So.2d 857 (Fla. 1961), quashing 122 So.2d 215
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
268. Ibid.
269. Dade County v. Renedo, 147 So.2d 313 (Fla. 1962), approving by discharging writ,
139 So.2d 698 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
270. Bainbridge v. State Road Dep't, 139 So.2d 714 (Fla. 1st Dist.), cert. denied, 143
So.2d 651 (Fla. 1962).
271. Garvin v. State Road Dep't, 149 So.2d 869 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963). In this case the
jury award was the lowest amount fixed by an appraiser but his estimate did not include
gasoline tanks and pumps which were also taken; hence the court concluded that nothing was
awarded for the tanks and pumps and that therefore the defendants did not receive just
compensation.
272. 143 So.2d 892 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
273. Ibid.
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assumptions, a partial taking does not relieve the tenant of his rental
obligations in the absence of a contrary provision in the lease.274 Thus,
renunciation by the lessee amounted to a breach giving the landlord the
right to consider the contract ended, and the abandonment by the tenant
with the acquiescence of the landlord amounted to a surrender by opera-
tion of law, although the tenant in fact intended to claim damages for loss
of his leasehold estate. 75
In another case276 the court held that a tenant was considered an
owner for purposes of being entitled to compensation under the damage
to business statute.2 7 In the much litigated controversy involving Anhoco
property,278 it was held that a property owner was entitled to damages
for temporary destruction of his right of access caused by work prior to the
condemnation of such property rights, and that he was entitled also to
damages for destruction of access rights prior to establishment of a new
frontage service road.2 79
VI. MECHANICS' LIENS AND MORTGAGES
A. Lien Law Revised
The mechanic's lien law was completely revised by the 1963 legisla-
ture.280 The changes were extensive both in substance and style. Because
of the extent of the changes made, consideration of the new act is ex-
cluded from this article and the reader is referred to other sources for
an exposition.2 " Further, since the cases reported during this biennium
were resolved under the former act,282 they are likewise excluded.283
274. See .Boyer and Wilcox, An Economic Appraisal of Leasehold Valuation In Con-
demnation Proceedings, 17 U. MLAmi L. REv. 245, 264 (1963). See also Parks Bldg., Inc. v.
Palm Beach County, 144 So.2d 830 (Fla. 2nd Dist. 1962), involving the apportionment of an
award between landlord and tenant on a partial taking.
275. Orange State Oil Co. v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority, supra note 272. As to
surrender by operation of law and related topics, see BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRNSAC-
TIONs §§ 36.10-.14 (1960).
276. State Road Dep't v. White, 148 So.2d 32 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962), aff'd and writ dis-
charged, 161 So.2d 829 (Fla. 1964).
277. FLA. STAT. § 73.10(4) (1963).
278. Previous litigation included Florida State Turnpike Authority v. Anhoco Corp., 116
So.2d 8 (Fla. 1959), modifying 107 So.2d 51 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958), effectuated, 117 So.2d 15,
16 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960).
279. Anhoco Corp. v. Dade County, 144 So.2d 793 (Fla. 1962), quashing 127 So.2d 464
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1961). It was also held that where the project was the cooperative effort
between the county, state road department and the Turnpike Authority, the county was
jointly and severally liable for the wrongs of the state road department.
280. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-135; FLA. STAT. §§ 84.011-.371 (1963).
281. 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL EsTATE TRANSACTIONS ch. 33 (1964 rev.); Ervin, Revised
Mechanics' Lien Law: The Whys and Wherefores, 37 FLA. B.J. 1095 (1963); Mechanics'
Lien Committee Report, 1963 Mechanics' Lien Law, 37 FLA. B.J. 1104 (1963).
282. FLA. STAT. §§ 84.01-.35 were repealed by Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-135, § 2.
283. 2 BOYER, op. cit. supra note 281, correlates the former and new act, cites many of
the decisions under the former act, and appraises the effect of the new act on those decisions.
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B. Mortgages-Acceleration Clauses, or Watch Thy Language
Baader v. Walker284 was a case of first impression involving the
question of whether an acceleration clause, automatic in form, was in fact
self-executing rather than simply giving the mortgagee an option to ac-
celerate. The case involved an accelerated payment in full to a collecting
agent who went into receivership, and the issue was whether the acceler-
ated payment was properly made.
Under the facts of the case, the plaintiffs had taken an assignment
of the mortgage executed by defendants; then the plaintiffs entered
into a servicing agreement with a collecting agent. The servicing agree-
ment provided that the agent should have sole authority as to matters of
collection and should pay the plaintiffs a stipulated monthly sum
whether or not payments by the mortgagor were actually received.
The acceleration clause285 declared that on default of payment of
principal or interest all notes so secured should forthwith become due and
payable notwithstanding their tenor. A payment due on December 20
was not paid until January 10, on which date the defendant paid the
balance of the entire indebtedness to the collecting agent. In March, with-
out having remitted the payment to the plaintiffs, the agent went into
receivership.
Finding no precise precedent in Florida, the court noted a conflict of
authority in other jurisdictions: some jurisdictions enforce the contract
as written, so that where no option is provided the entire sum is acceler-
ated ipso facto on the happening of the condition specified; others re-
gard the clause as in the nature of a penalty inserted for the benefit of
the creditor, giving him an option to declare the whole sum due.286 In
deciding that the first alternative was the sounder view, the court con-
cluded that the accelerated payment was properly made to the agent
under the authority of the servicing agreement, and affirmed the chan-
cellor's decree that the mortgage should be satisfied of record.
In the instant case the sympathies were obviously with the mort-
gagor,287 but the choice of construction is none the less valid. Although
acceleration clauses are obviously inserted for the protection of the
mortgagee, there is no compelling reason for not enforcing them as
284. 153 So.2d 51 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963), cert. denied, 156 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1963).
285. The case does not specify whether the clause was in the mortgage, the note(s),
or both.
286. Citations to the two viewpoints are found in 153 So.2d at 54-55.
287. Id. at 55, pointing out that the mortgagor had a third grade education and was
not versed in the niceties of the law of mortgages and negotiable instruments; that he used
his savings to pay the debt in a good faith belief that it was due; and that the plaintiffs
had clothed their agent with authority to promote collection and enforce the terms of the
note and mortgage, which terms included the acceleration clause. Had the acceleration been
optional, one might still wonder whether the court might have found that the agent had
authority, actual, ostensible or by estoppel, to exercise the option on behalf of the plaintiffs.
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written. The mortgagee can, of course, waive 2 ' the acceleration on minor
defaults, but he need not do so. In other ways, however, an automatic
acceleration clause may be prejudicial to the mortgagee. In effect, it gives
the mortgagor the power to accelerate by defaulting in a payment. The
mortgagor may wish to do this if interest rates fall and he can refinance
at a lower rate. He may also wish to satisfy the mortgage if he should
fortuitiously come into a sum of money. However, at the time the mort-
gage is executed, the mortgagee has bargaining power and he may avoid
this pitfall by having the clause read "the entire sum shall become due
and payable at -the option of the mortgagee."
C. Mortgages-Deficiency Decrees
A number of cases involved deficiency decrees and the circumstances
justifying their award. It was determined that under the alternative
method of foreclosure by clerk's sale,289 although the final decree of fore-
closure did not retain jurisdiction for the purpose of entering a deficiency
decree, nevertheless the court has jurisdiction for at least ten days after
the issuance of the statutory certificate of title to entertain a motion for
such decree.2 9 0 This decision was partly based on the fact that a petition
for rehearing may be filed within such ten day period.2 9' In another case 92
involving foreclosure by clerk's sale, it was held that where the court
reserved jurisdiction to entertain a motion for deficiency, such motion is
timely filed if it is made either within the period within the limitation
statute for institution of a cause of action under -the note and mortgage,
or within the one year period after which the cause could have been
abated pursuant to statutory authority,293 according to whichever period
occurred first.
The awarding of a deficiency is within the discretion of the court, but
the discretion must be exercised in accordance with equitable principles.29 4
288. See Koschorek v. Fischer, 145 So.2d 755 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962), holding that whether
or not the mortgagees by their conduct waived or were estopped to assert an acceleration
precluded a summary decree; Overholser v. Theroux, 149 So.2d 582 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963),
denying acceleration because the mortgagee's vacillation made it impossible for the mort-
gagor to know whether his account was current, past due or paid.
289. FLA. STAT. §§ 702.02, and 702.021 (1963).
290. Katz v. Koolish, 142 So.2d 759 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
291. Ibid., citing Maule Indus. v. Seminole Rock and Sand Co., 91 So.2d 307 (Fla.
1956); also citing Cole v. Heidt, 124 Fla. 264, 168 So. 11 (1936), stating that if jurisdiction
is not reserved to adjudicate a deficiency, the case cannot be reopened for such purpose after
the decree becomes absolute. FLA. STAT. § 702.02(3) (1963) provides that if no objections
to the sale are filed within ten days, the sale shall be confirmed, and FLA. STAT. § 702.02(5)
(1963) provides that if no objections are filed within ten days after filing by the clerk of
the certificate of sale, the value of the property shall be conclusively presumed to be the
amount bid therefore.
292. Colmes v. Hoco, Inc., 152 So.2d 524 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
293. FLA. STAT. § 45.19 (1963), authorizing dismissal for want of prosecution when a
case is permitted to be dormant for one year.
294. Kurkjian v. Fish Carburetor Corp., 145 So.2d 523 (Fla. 1962).
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Thus, the denial of a deficiency will not be upheld when neither the record
nor the order indicate the reasons justifying such refusal s.2 9 When, how-
ever, the mortgagee purchases at the foreclosure sale and the equity in
the property exceeds the mortgage debt, a deficiency is properly denied.29 6
D. Usury
The proper method of determining the applicable interest rate was
one of the knotty problems before the courts in Home Credit Co. v.
Brown.297 The complicated transactions between the parties developed
from a home improvement construction and the execution of "non-inter-
est" bearing notes in an amount sufficient to cover interest for the entire
period the notes were to run. The notes contained acceleration pro-
visions which were invoked after default.
The district court of appeal held that the assignee of the notes could
not avoid the consequences of usery by its willingness to reduce its
claim to the principal indebtedness plus interest to date rather than sue
for the full amount of the notes when such willingness was not exhibited
until after the trial was under way.2 98 The supreme court of Florida,299
although disagreeing with some of the lower court's reasoning, affirmed
by discharging the writ of certiorari.
According to the supreme court, computations under the usury law
must be based on a determination of the scope of acceleration rights which
a note or contract purports to give a lender or holder and not upon the
sums actually claimed by him. The vice of usury is said to be that which
inheres in the agreement of the parties itself. The results of an exercise
of an acceleration clause must be evaluated under the literal terms of the
contract whether or not the plaintiff seeks recovery of all the sums. 300
The court then added, however, that the presence of the acceleration
clause contingent on default did not alone warrant a finding of usury at
the inception of the transaction. Further, in testing the results of the
exercise of the option to accelerate, the reserved interest must be calcu-
lated as payment for the use of the borrowed money until the accelera-
tion option becomes effective by entry of the decree. Note that the sig-
nificant date is not the time of the election to accelerate, nor the filing of
suit, but the entry of the decree.
The cumulative effect of these observations would seem to be that
where the face value of the note is enlarged to include the total amount
295. Ibid.; Colmes v. Hoco, Inc., supra note 292.
296. Kennedy v. Kay, 154 So.2d 345 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
297. 148 So.2d 257 (Fla. 1963), discharging writ for Brown v. Home Credit Co., 137
So.2d 887 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
298. Brown v. Home Credit Co., 137 So.2d 887 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
299. Home Credit Co. v. Brown, 148 So.2d 257 (Fla. 1963).
300. Ibid.
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of interest accruing over the period of -the loan, the agreement is not
per se usurious, even when it provides for acceleration on default. If,
however, the lender elects to accelerate, even if he does not seek all un-
earned interest, the effect so far as usury is concerned is the same as if
he did, but the period will be measured not from the time of acceleration
but from the entry of the decree. The lender presumably can protect
himself from the usury pitfall by inserting in the note itself"0' a provision
reciting that in case of acceleration he may recover only the outstanding
principal plus interest to the date of the decree.
Other cases involving usury held that: (1) although the scheme util-
ized to circumvent usury may have been suggested by the borrower,
the lenders were not excused from the effects of the resulting usury; 02
(2) usury is not applicable to a speculative risk; 03 (3) a holder in due
course is not subject to the defense of usury; 0 4 and (4) the rule that
the use of a corporate shell to cloak a loan to an individual borrower will
not be allowed to defeat the usury laws was inapplicable to a particular
loan to a corporation.3 0 5
E. Mortgage Validity, or the Case of the Non-Estopped
Owners and the Careless Lenders
In King v. L. & L. Investors, Inc., 06 two Negro women conveyed
vacant property which they owned to a construction company which
was to re-convey the property to them after constructing an apartment
house on it. The construction company mortgaged the property for
301. See text following note 279 supra for another aspect of the importance of the
language used in acceleration clauses. See also Olson v. Hirschberg, 145 So.2d 303 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1962), holding provision in acceleration clause for interest of 10% was inapplicable
to the interest to be charged after maturity and that therefore the legal rate of 6% was
applicable.
302. Lee Constr. Corp. v. Newman, 143 So.2d 222 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962), cert. denied,
148 So.2d 280 (Fla. 1962).
303. Diversified Enterprises v. West, 141 So.2d 27 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
304. Harrison v. Consumers Mortgage Co., 154 So.2d 194 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963). This
rule was also recognized in Home Credit Co. v. Brown, supra note 297, but found in-
applicable since the assignee there was a participant from the beginning and not a holder
in due course.
305. Rosenhouse v. Kimbrig, 147 So.2d 354 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962), cert. denied, 149 So.2d
47 (Fla. 1963). The interest charged was approximately 13%, thus under the 15% allowed
to be charged corporations, FLA. STAT. § 687.02 (1963), the rate was valid, but was usurious
as to individuals where only 10% is allowed, ibid. In the instant case the corporation had
been in existence for three years and had owned the mortgaged property for six months,
and all the parties had regarded the transaction as a loan to the corporation. Four days
after the loan was closed, the mortgaged premises were conveyed to the endorser of the
note. There was also no evidence to show that the attorney and loan broker who received
a fee for his services was an agent of the lender or that any of his fee was received by the
lender; hence no part of such fee could properly be regarded as interest so as to make the
transaction usurious as requiring payment in excess of 15%.
306. 133 So.2d 744 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961). In subsequent proceedings, 136 So.2d 671
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1962), it was held that after the court of appeal had issued a mandate to
enter a decree for the defendants, the chancellor was without jurisdiction to do otherwise,
and he exceeded his jurisdiction in granting a stay and ordering inquiry as to possible fraud.
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60,000 dollars and later conveyed the property to the individual owners
of the investment company which was the mortgagee. The day after
conveying the property, the construction company purportedly executed
a second mortgage to the investment company in the amount of 41,500
dollars. Upon completion of the improvements, the property was re-con-
veyed to the two women, subject to the two mortgages.
The investment company, as mortgagee, brought suit to foreclose
the second mortgage, and the chancellor entered a summary final decree
foreclosing the second mortgage. The appellate court in reversing held
that the mortgage was invalid because the mortgagor did not have title at
the time the second mortgage was executed. To the contention that the
owners were estopped to deny the validity of the second mortgage because
the deed reconveying the land specifically provided it was subject to the
two mortgages, the court pointed out that such rule is applicable to
purchasers only when the mortgages specified are part of the purchase
price. In the instant case the grantees were not purchasers, but rather
were the original owners at the outset, and were also the equitable own-
ers while the title was held by others during the construction. On reacquir-
ing the title, the owners took the property subject to valid encumbrances
but not subject to invalid mortgages. Accordingly, it was held that the de-
fendant-owners were entitled to a summary final decree of dismissal.
The record failed to establish either the price for which the building
was to be constructed or the actual cost incurred. Thus, it is difficult to de-
termine the fairness of the result. The legal principles evolved are sound
enough, but one might wonder whether some form of relief-equitable,
restitutionary, or otherwise-might have been invoked on behalf of the
lenders had it been established that the combined mortgages were a fair
price for the construction and the total amount was not disproportionate
to the contract price.
F. Priorities, Leasehold Mortgages and Subordination
The proper method of foreclosing two mortgages, one on the fee and
one on the leasehold, both held by the same mortgagee, was the issue
involved in Applefield v. Fidelity Savings & Loan Ass'n.3 1 7 In that case
a long term lessee executed a note and mortgage for improving the real
property under lease, which lease permitted but did not require construc-
tion of the improvements. The lessor-fee owner executed an agreement
to the lender subordinating all his interest in the property to the lien of
the designated mortgage, which instrument was duly executed and re-
corded. Subsequently the lender loaned an additional 25,000 dollars tak-
ing a second mortgage without requesting an additional subordination
agreement. Later, the lessor conveyed the reversionary' fee title.
307. 137 So.2d 259 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
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After default on the note, the lender brought suit to foreclose both
mortgages alleging that both mortgages were superior to the reversion-
ary fee title. The chancellor held that the first mortgage was a valid lien
on both the fee and the leasehold interest and that the second mort-
gage was a valid second lien on the leasehold interest and ordered pay-
ment of sums due on both mortgages. However, the holder of the rever-
sionary fee title was allowed to redeem under ,the first mortgage, in which
event the sale was to be limited to the leasehold interest for the purpose
of satisfying the second mortgage. The appellate court, affirming, held
that the chancellor correctly construed the agreement as subjecting the
reversionary fee to the lien of the first mortgage and that the court had
not abused its discretion in the manner in which the sale was to be
made.
G. Statute of Limitations and Taxes
Freeman v. New Smyana Enterprises30 8 was a suit to quiet title in
which the defendant claimed an interest as a result of an old mortgage
and the payment of taxes and the redemption of tax certificates. Noting
that the general doctrine of unjust enrichment was one of the most neb-
ulous fields of Florida equity jurisprudence, the court then proceeded on
more specific grounds.
The original mortgagee was barred by ,the statute of limitations.0 9 An
earlier case 10 had held that although action on a mortgage might be
barred by the then applicable statute of limitations, the statute did not
apply 'to the amount paid by the mortgagee for taxes on the mortgaged
property since that was not a part of the original debt, and the mort-
gagee was entitled to recover such amount. In the following year, how-
ever, the legislature amended the limitations statute to provide that a
mortgagee shall have no right of subrogation to the lien of the state for
taxes paid on the mortgaged property unless the mortgagee obtains an
assignment from the state of the tax sale certificate, and that redemption
of the tax sale certificate in itself is insufficient for subrogation pur-
poses.31'
The court accordingly held that the mortgagee was entitled to an
equitable lien for taxes paid on the mortgaged premises prior to June
23, 1955, the effective date of the statute and a time at which his mort-
gage was still effectual." 2 He was not entitled to a lien for taxes paid
308. 135 So.2d 452 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
309. The mortgage was executed in 1927 to secure a debt of $175 payable one year
after date. Thus, action on the mortgage would have been barred in 1948.
310. H.K.L. Realty Corp. v. Kirtley, 74 5o.2d 876 (Fla. 1954), discussed in Boyer,
Survey of Real Property Law, 10 MLxsi L.Q. 389, 391 (1956).
311. Fla. Laws 1955, ch. 29977, amending FLA. STAT. § 95.28 (1963).
312. It would appear that the mortgage was effectual at such time only for enforcing
the debt of taxes paid. See supra note 309.
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thereafter, nor to a lien on an adjacent parcel for any taxes paid since
he did not have a mortgage thereon or any other interest that would jus-
tify his paying the taxes. The court failed to mention the effect of section
95.021 of the Florida Statutes, which brings the state within the applica-
tion of the twenty-year limitations statute. 13
The decision affords a little relief to this apparently unlearned mort-
gagee who "paid taxes at least around 30 or 32 years" '14 and otherwise
looked after this vacant property. The present fee owner may or may not
have acquired a windfall, since it was not shown when he purchased the
property or how much he had paid for it. Clearly, though, the present
owner and his predecessors collectively derived a substantial benefit from
the defendant's payment of their taxes. Of course, the defendant could
have foreclosed at any time within twenty years, actually taken posses-
sion31 5 as an adverse possessor, or otherwise endeavored to protect him-
self. The decision aids marketability to a limited extent, but, in spite
of the time involved,3 16 still makes it somewhat hazardous for the title ex-
aminer to rely completely on the statute of limitations to bar an action
on a mortgage.
H. Devise of Mortgaged Land
In a case of first impression, the Third District Court of Appeal
held that, since no statute had been enacted changing the common law
rule of exoneration, a specific devisee of mortgaged real property was
entitled to have the mortgage on the devised property paid at the ex-
pense of the residue of the estate unless the will expressly manifested a
contrary intent, or unless an implied contrary intent could be extracted
from -the will as a whole.3 17
VII. LANDLORD AND TENANT
A. Constructive Eviction, or Who's That Man In
The Girl's Dormitory?
In Richards v. Dodge318 the lessor, who had leased an apartment
house to be used as living quarters for girls attending the lessee's school,
ceased her activities as housemother and leased her private apartment
313. FLA. STAT. § 95.021 (1963), enacted in 1953, provides that any twenty year statute
of limitations shall apply to actions by the state or its agencies.
314. Freeman v. New Smyrna Enterprises, Inc., supra note 308, at 453.
315. He had cut the grass over the years, but this was apparently not even urged as
acts of dominion sufficient to constitute adverse possession, and he was denied a lien for
such services.
316. See note 309 supra.
317. Ashkenazy v. Ashkenazy's Estate, 140 So.2d 331 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962). The court
also found that the testator intended to exonerate from lien specifically devised shares of
stock which were not encumbered when the will was made.
318. 150 So.2d 477 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
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to a male tenant. In an action for rent after abandonment by the lessees,
the trial court's judgment for the defendants was reversed on appeal.
It was held that the lessees had waived any right to assert a constructive
eviction by their failure promptly to notify the lessor of their objection
to the male tenant and by their continuing in possession from February
until April. The decision is in accord with the general rule that a tenant
must abandon the premises within a reasonable time after the landlord's
wrongful act in order to take advantage of the doctrine of constructive
eviction.319
B. The Case of the Leaky Roof
In Berwick Corp. v. Kleinginna Investment Corp.,320 tenants were
successful in asserting a constructive eviction because of a leaky roof.
The case involved the lease of a motel in which the lessor covenanted to
keep the roof in repair. The roof was in disrepair for the greater part of
the year and the landlord made several attempts at repairs. Finally, the
lessor decided to replace the entire roof. Then the rains camel The entire
third floor was rendered uninhabitable and considerable damage was
done to other parts of the motel. When the tenants vacated, the land-
lord resumed possession, and the subsequent litigation decided that
there was sufficient interference with the tenant's enjoyment to con-
stitute a constructive eviction. Accordingly, the tenants were entitled to
a return of their security deposits.
C. Security-Damages or Penalty?
In construing provisions for the retention of a sum of money after
default by the lessee, the courts followed established precedent to de-
termine whether a given provision was a valid stipulation for liquidated
damages or an unenforceable provision for a penalty. Stuco Corp. v.
Gates 321 followed Hyman v. Cohen.22 and concluded that an ambiguous
agreement for the forfeiture of a 90,000 dollar security deposit upon the
lessee's breach of a motel lease was a valid stipulation for liquidated dam-
ages. The court noted that actual damages were difficult to ascertain in
advance because the lease market for motels fluctuates constantly during
the lifetime of the lease, that the sum specified was not dispropor-
tionate to any damages that might reasonably be expected, and that the
presumption is in favor of liquidated damages rather than a penalty. 323
On the other hand, although it might otherwise satisfy the liqui-
319. 32 Am. JUR. Landlord and Tenant §§ 245-64 (1955).
320. 143 So.2d 684 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
321. 145 So.2d 527 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
322. 73 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1954).
323. These three principles-presumption in favor of liquidated damages, the difficulty
of advance ascertainment of actual damages, and the reasonableness of the amount stipu-
lated-were set forth in Hyman v. Cohen, supra, note 322. The annual rental in the instant
case was $91,000 for a ten year term, and the stipulated damages were $90,000.
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dated damage test, the addition of a provision granting the lessor the op-
tion of either retaining the deposit as liquidated damages or applying it
pro tanto against the actual damages renders the clause a penalty. 24 This
results from the fact that the lessor will elect to treat the stipulation as
liquidated damages only if it were in excess of his actual damages. The
lessee in effect would have to pay the greater of the sum stipulated or
the lessor's actual damages; thus there would be no mutuality of agree-
ment as to prospective damages.32
The supreme court discharged the writ of certiorari in the con-
troversial case of Platt v. Mannheimer,"2 O thus letting stand the deci-
sion3 27 allowing the landlord to recover past due rents, taxes and in-
surance in addition to the liquidated damages specified. As in the district
court of appeal,32 there was a dissenting opinion 29 on the merits as well as
on the question of jurisdiction to take certiorari, and the opinion was
expressed that the parties ought to be bound by their agreements.3
The doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract was applied to a
breach by the landlord in Brewer v. Northgate of Orlando, Inc.83 1 In
that case the landlord, shortly after execution of the lease and apparently
because of an opportunity for sale to a shopping center developer, no-
tified the lessee that he could not construct the agreed upon building and
returned the rental payments. In the resulting litigation, it was held that
the tenant could regard the landlord's conduct as an anticipatory breach of
the entire contract and could recover as general damages the difference
between the rent stipulated and the present reasonable rental value for
the term, the total sum being reduced to its present worth.
D. Surrender by Operation of Law
Familiar prinicples of surrounder by operation of law33 2 were re-
affirmed in several cases involving some unusual factors. Katz v. Ken-
holtz333 held that a landlord who gave a three-day statutory notice to
324. Pappas v. Deringer, 145 So.2d 770 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962), following Stenor, Inc. v.
Lester, 58 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1951).
325. Pappas v. Deringer, supra note 324, at 772.
326. 149 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1963).
327. Platt v. Mannheimer, 124 So.2d 503 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960), noted in Boyer, Real
Property Law, 16 U. MIAmi L. REv. 139, 175' (1961).
328. 124 So.2d at 504.
329. 149 So.2d at 538.
330. The only damages specified was the improvement erected by the lessee. Additional
recovery was allowed on the basis of dicta in Kanter v. Safran, 68 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1953),
later decisions, 82 So.2d 508 (Fla. 1955), and 99 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1958), to the effect that
damage stipulations do not normally include past due rents, taxes and insurance because
of their ascertainable characteristics.
331. 143 So.2d 358 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
332. See generally 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 36.10(3) (1960);
also Orange State Oil Co. v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority, supra note 272 and
accompanying text.
333. 147 So.2d 342 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
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pay past due rent or vacate did not make an election of accepting a sur-
render on the tenant's vacation. Accordingly, it was held that the land-
lord's acceptance of the keys did not preclude him from holding the
tenant for any deficiency resulting from attempting "to relet on his be-
half" in accordance with the terms of the lease.
In Babsdon Co. v. Thrifty Parking Co.,83 4 a lessee-sublessor, after
default by a remote sublessee, notified the sub-sublessee either to pay
or to deliver possession for the account of the sublessee. The sub-sub-
lessee refused and the sublessor then brought an unlawful detainer ac-
tion to recover possession. After recovering possession, the sublessor
brought an action in the circuit court seeking a decree that its possession
was acquired rightfully on behalf of the sublessee and that it could re-
cover the difference between the stipulated rentals and what in good faith
could be obtained by reletting, such sum to be applied against the sec-
urity deposit which the sublessor claimed the right to possess. In re-
versing the chancellor's decree and holding for the sublessor, the appellate
court stated that an unlawful detainer action was not inconsistent with
the previously expressed intention of holding the sublessee responsible
for the rents stipulated. The court further stated that the bringing of such
action did not constitute an abandonment by the sublessor of his pre-
viously chosen course of action.135
Though the decision appears justified, it unfortunately fails to dis-
cuss the significance of the fact that the action in effect was between a
landlord and subtenant and not simply between a landlord and tenant.
There is both privity of estate and privity of contract between a landlord
and tenant, privity of estate only between a landlord and assignee, and
generally no privity at all between a landlord and subtenant.33 6 Thus,
it would seem that generally no direct action can be maintained be-
tween a landlord and subtenant in the absence of third party bene-
ficiary principles of contract law. Of course, the subtenant is entitled to no
greater rights than the tenant; hence, on the non-payment of rent the
subtenant as well as the tenant can be evicted. In the instant case,
the party occupying the position of tenant, as well as the one occupying
the position of subtenant, was made a party to the action, and the re-
lief requested and obtained was based on the theory that the landlord
was acquiring possession as the agent of the tenant. Of course, the prin-
cipal obligation fell on the subtenant, and the overall effect is seemingly
a reduction of litigation-the rights of all the parties may be determined
in one suit instead of permitting the landlord to sue only the tenant
and then requiring the tenant in turn to sue the subtenant. However, in
the event of differences in the amount of security and in rentals specified,
334. 149 So.2d 566 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
335. Ibid.
336. See generally 2 BOYER, op. cit. supra note 332, at § 36.08.
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it may be difficult to spell out the rights and obligations of all the parties
in such an abbreviated action. Further, it could be possible that the sub-
tenant might have a defense against the tenant which would be unavail-
able to the tenant in an action against him by the landlord.
In Arvantes v. Gilbert,37 the court gave effect to a written provision
in a lease stating that no surrender should be valid unless accepted by
the lessor in writing and affirmed a decree recognizing the tenant's con-
tinuing liability. A somewhat contradictory provision which seemingly
authorized a cancellation if the tenants should abandon the premises,
was mentioned but, construing the lease as a whole, the specific provision
as to a written acceptance of surrender was held controlling.
E. Covenants-Construction
A number of landlord-tenant cases involved the construction of
covenants. These cases show no significant legal developments and are
simply reported as indicating general techniques of construction. Among
the decided cases, it was held that: (1) in accordance with the rule of
strictly construing provisions restricting alienation, a lease provision
against assignment without the written consent of the lessor did not pre-
clude the lessee from mortgaging his lease hold without such consent; 38
(2) a lease which contained both a covenant that the lessee would con-
struct a valuable improvement and a provision that the tenant might as-
sign to an assuming assignee with the transferror to be relieved of any
liability, did not relieve the assignor from accrued liability to the land-
lord and did not permit the assignee to take free from liability for ac-
crued defaults;3 39 (3) the landlords of a dock and buildings were not li-
able to subtenants for failure to repair damages caused by a hurricane
when the original lease contained no covenant obligating the landlords to
repair; 340 (4) an agreement that a particular service station would handle
one company's products exclusively was not intended to prohibit the
dealer from selling a different brand of tire; 341 (5) a lease calling for a
minimum rental plus a percentage, providing that the premises were to
be used for the operation of a jewelry store, and further providing that
the tenant had the right to remove fixtures if it vacated the premises at
337. 143 So.2d 825 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
338. Great So. Aircraft Corp. v. Kraus, 132 So.2d 608 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961), appeal
dismissed, 133 So.2d 788 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
339. Sheldon v. Tierman, 147 So.2d 167 (Fla. 2d Dist.), motion granted, 147 So.2d 593
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1962). The court stated that to construe it otherwise, that is to relieve both
the assignor and assignee from accrued default, would have the effect of relieving from
liability all parties except the lessor. An agreement should not be interpreted as placing
one party at the mercy of the others unless it is clear that such was the intention.
340. Fischer v. Collier, 143 So.2d 710 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962). The court made no mention
of the lack of privity between landlord and subtenant. See text following note 336 supra.
Of course, if the landlord is not liable to the tenant, as the case stated, he is obviously
not liable to a subtenant in the absence of a new agreement.
341. General Tire v. Aeroland Oil Co., 132 So.2d 364 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
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any time during the continuance of the lease, was held to contain neither
an express nor implied covenant that the tenant should operate its jew-
elry business on the premises for the entire term;. 42 and (6) a percentage
lease requiring the payment of 50 per cent of the net profits as addi-
tional rent, did not specifically preclude the tenants' deduction of ground
rent and taxes in the computation of net profits, and since the landlord
had acquiesced in such deductions for four years, the court would ac-
cept the parties' practical construction of the lease and permit such de-
ductions. 43
F. Holdover Tenant; Distress Liens
David Properties, Inc. v. Selk 341 was a case of first impression in-
volving the right of the landlord to demand a greatly increased rent
from the holdover tenant. The controversy originated in the sale of a
large tract of land in which the seller took back a purchase money mort-
gage and was given permission to remain in possession of a simple
dwelling for a period of time. Later this "license" to remain was for-
malized by the execution of a lease reciting consideration of one dollar
and an expiration date seventy days later.
The purchaser-landlord later gave the seller-tenant notice to vacate
at the end of the period or be charged rental at the rate of 300 dollars
per month. The tenant failed to vacate and also failed to vacate on subse-
quent notices of similar import. The tenant sued to foreclose the mort-
gage, and the landlord counterclaimed for accrued rent at the rate of
300 dollars per month. At the time of the trial, the tenant was an 83 year
old man who appeared senile.345 The appellate court held that a
landlord had the right to waive the wrong occasioned by a tenant's holding
over and treat him as a tenant, at the same time demanding an increased
rent if the tenant should elect to remain. It was accordingly held that
the landlord-mortgagor was entitled to set-off against the mortgage a sum
equivalent to the amount of increased rent. 46
The priority between a landlord's lien for rent and unrecorded fed-
eral tax liens was the point in controversy in United States v. Weissman. 47
342. Stemmler v. Moon Jewelry Co., 139 So.2d 150 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962), cert. denied,
146 So.2d 375 (Fla. 1962).
343. Mileage Realty Co. v. Miami Parking Garage, Inc., 146 So.2d 403 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1962), cert. denied, 153 So.2d 307 (Fla. 1963).
344. 151 So.2d 334 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963). This case has been noted in 18 U. MmIAe L
REV. 219 (1963).
345. The appellate court, 151 So.2d at 338, pointed out this observation had no bearing
on the matter since there was nothing in either the pleadings or evidence to indicate the
tenant was irresponsible at the time he received the notices, and further, that even if he
were incompetent at the time of the trial, it cannot be inferred that such condition existed
two and one half years earlier.
346. David Properties, Inc., v. Selk, supra note 344.
347. 135 So.2d 235 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
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The federal lien prevailed in accordance with established prece-
dent.848 The federal lien becomes effective from the time of assessment and
if unrecorded is invalid only as to subsequent mortgagees, pledgees, pur-
chasers and judgment creditors. 49 Since the landlord is not within any of
the four enumerated categories, all the unrecorded tax assessment ren-
dered before default in rental payments had priority over the landlord's
lien. Although the landlord's lien is effective from the commencement of
the lease or the bringing of the chattels on the premises, 3 0 such lien was
regarded as inchoate or unperfected under federal law.85'
The landlord's lien has been characterized as a "lien of distress
for rent" within the Bankruptcy Act limiting such liens to the amount of
three months' rental.3 5 2
G. Cooperatives
Although the legal principles involved are not particularly significant,
two cases involving cooperative apartments within the period of this
survey are noted because of the increasing popularity of such structures.
In Willmont v. Tellone,35 3 a decree was affirmed rescinding the "sale" of
a 99 year lease on a cooperative apartment when the project was frus-
trated because of the inability of the developers to sell the remaining
units. The same case also decided that compliance with the Security Act
was not necessary when the purpose of the corporation to be formed and
the acquisition of a share of stock was purely incidental to the lease of
the apartment.
Lexington Arms, Inc. v. Henrick,354 involved the right of the lessor,
a cooperative apartment corporation, to terminate an apartment lease for
violation of a covenant prohibiting occupancy by children under twelve
years of age. Because the petition failed to allege compliance with terms
of the lease as to termination after default, the court concluded that the
lessor stated no grounds authorizing eviction, affirmed the order of dis-
missal, and declined to comment on the validity of the restriction against
children.
348. See generally Ross, Federal Tax Liens-Their Impact on the Law of Real Property,
18 U. MIAmi L. REv. 183 (1963).
349. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6322-23(a).
350. FLA. STAT. § 83.08(2) (1963).
351. United States v. Weissman, supra note 347.
352. City Bldg. Corp. v. Farish, 292 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1951).
353. 137 So.2d 610 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
354. 153 So.2d 31 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
1964]
